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BRINGING ORDER TO CONTRACTS AGAINST
PUBLIC POLICY
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN*
ABSTRACT
In 1821, Judge Burrough famously described the public policy defense in contract law
as a “very unruly horse.” To test this proposition, this Article presents the first systematic
content analysis of public policy defense case law. The sparse previous literature and commentaries on this defense, which relied on theory and leading cases, tend to accept the notion that this area of contract law proves unruly. I reveal an underlying order that emerges
from the ordinary run of public policy defense cases, rather than the leading cases.
An examination of opinions written in 2009 reveals that public policy defenses that specify a violation of a statute or regulation tend to be twice as successful than those that appeal
broadly to public policy. Further, the employment of the defense can be segmented to show
that the “unruly” cases only comprise one-third of the sample. These findings, among others,
significantly cut the magnitude of the perceived “unruly horse” problem and should reframe
our approach to the public policy defense.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“When they argued this case . . . it was said there was no consideration, and if there was it was illegal. . . . If it be illegal, it must be
illegal either on the ground that it is against public policy, or
against some particular law. I, for one, protest . . . against arguing
too strongly upon public policy;—it is a very unruly horse, and
when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.
It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but
when other points fail.” 1

Judge Burrough’s enduring “unruly horse” metaphor for the public
policy defense to contract2 appears in contract literature,3 in contract

1. Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing 229, 251-52 (Burrough J.) (emphasis added). As Percy Winfield wrote in 1928:
That [horse] has proved to be a rather obtrusive, not to say, blundering, steed
in the law reports. . . . And at times the horse has looked like even less accommodating animals. Some judges appear to have thought it more like a tiger,
and have refused to mount it at all, perhaps because they feared the fate of the
young lady of Riga. Others have regarded it like Balaam’s ass which would carry its rider nowhere. But none . . . has looked upon it as a Pegasus that might
soar beyond the momentary needs of the community.
Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 91
(1928).
2. Judicial invocation of public policy stretches across the common law. See Richard
A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 293 (1975); Hans A.
Linde, Courts and Torts, “Public Policy” Without Public Politics?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 821
(1994). This Article limits the focus to contracts.
3. See, e.g., John Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly Horse: Public Policy in the Law of
Contract, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1972).

2012]

BRINGING ORDER TO CONTRACTS

565

treatises,4 and in case law.5 When a party asks a court to refrain from
enforcing an otherwise valid bargain on the grounds that it would
offend public policy, the party asks the court to do something out of
the ordinary. Instead of requesting the court to apply a traditional
common law defense, the court is being asked to discern public policy,
or possibly pronounce public policy. This can compel a court’s reliance
on statutes,6 regulations,7 prior case law proclaiming public policy
serving as precedent,8 or as troublingly described by M.P. Furmston,
reliance “on reasoning not convincingly or completely adumbrated.”9
This Article tests the “very unruly horse” metaphor to see if the
description remains valid wisdom nearly two centuries later. No existing contracts literature empirically evaluates the content of the
cases involving the public policy defense in a systematic manner. I
attempt to partially fill that gap in the literature here. I hope to contribute to a more elegant structural understanding of the public policy defense by importing the case law as we find it, rather than by just
providing a study of the “leading cases,”10 as some of the literature
does. Essentially, this Article aims to provide another view of the defense—a view based on what courts are routinely doing, not based on
what the most famous or leading cases say or what the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts attempts to restate or prescribe.
Generally, I set out in this Article to find a simpler, more predictive way of categorizing the cases—to address, among other questions, whether some types of a challenge to enforceability on public
policy grounds were more successful than others and whether certain
categories were more orderly or “unruly” than others.
4. See, e.g., 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY § 79.3, at n.2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003); 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:2 (4th ed. 2009);
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 22.1 (5th ed. 2003); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 326 (3d ed. 1999).

5. See, e.g., Blackburn & McCune, PLLC v. Pre-Paid Legal Svcs., Inc., No. M200901584-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2670816 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2010); Giannecchini
v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000); Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 330 (Pa. 2010); Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 257 P.3d
1049, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); Seigneur v. Nat’l Fitness Inst., Inc., 752 A.2d 631, 641-42
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See infra Part IV.B.1-2. Or, in some cases, to infer no justification because of the
absence of supporting sources.
9. M. P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 308
(1966).
10. As Allan Farnsworth noted, focusing on “leading cases” does not help doctrine
develop, nor does it aid the advancement of scholarship. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts
Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406, 1462 (1987). Grant Gilmore
also famously noted the consequences of this Langdellian tradition of using “leading cases”
to paste together contract law. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 19 (Ronald
K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995).
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After analyzing a consistent sample of public policy contractual
defense cases, I conclude that Judge Burrough’s metaphorical horse
is not uniformly “unruly”—categories of these cases can be discerned,
and some categories appear more orderly than others. In this Article,
I define these categories and provide some descriptions of cases within each of them. Hopefully, this redefinition and proposed new
framework for the defense can simplify our understanding of the defense and at least point us in a clearer direction for its application.
To undergird my analysis, in Part II of the Article, I review some
of the sparse literature and commentary on illegal contracts and the
public policy defense, including the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. In Part III, I set out the empirical agenda that I attempt to
fulfill and the methodology I employed. I then discuss the outcome of
the content analysis in Part IV, the categories of public policy cases
that emerge, and examples of the cases that populate them. I also
empirically describe the Restatement’s lack of efficacy in this area. In
Part V, I briefly and modestly suggest some potential revisions to the
description of and the approach to the public policy defense, in light
of my core findings in Part IV.
Before delving into the details of my methodology and analysis, I
highlight a few of the primary conclusions I reached. My refined
sample of opinions reveals that roughly half (forty-eight percent) of
the public policy contracts cases are resolved by invoking or looking
to a statute or regulation. When the public policy defense invokes a
statute or regulation it is almost twice as likely to be successful in its
attack on the contract (fifty-nine percent of the time) than when the
defense invokes mere case law or a broad, general appeal to public
policy (thirty-one percent).11 These statutory/regulatory cases appear
to follow a more direct path and could be described as “ruly.”12
The defenses that employ broader appeals to general public policy
tend to be less successful. Perhaps Judge Burrough’s observation in
Richardson that the defense “is never argued at all but when other
points fail,”13 merely reflected the lower rate of the defense’s success
in this category. This basic distinction between the statutory/regulatory cases and the broader, general cases could be viewed as
cutting the magnitude of the “unruly horse” problem at least in half.
Some order can be drawn just in noting that invocation of the defense
in these circumstances is substantially more likely to fail.
However, further distinctions can be made among even these general public policy cases. For example, it seems that when the defense
11. To be precise, 1.9 times more likely.
12. I coin the term “ruly,” which is not an AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY word, to
contrast with the world “unruly,” used in Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294,
303; 2 Bing 229, 251-52 (Burrough J.).
13. Id.
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succeeds within the “broader appeal” to “general public policy” category, courts often draw upon other case precedent that declares the
public policy. These courts cite the public policy found by previous
courts as they would common law—without any reference to a statute or regulation. This reliance on precedent brings a degree of order
and legitimacy to the defenses that fit this category, rendering them
only “somewhat ruly” in my framework. They remain “unruly” to a
certain degree because the public policy findings in these cases are
merely based on other judicial findings.
As I describe below, the remaining “unsuccessful” uses of the public policy defense tend to be the “unruly” portion of the cases. I contend that the unruliness of these cases should not prove completely
disconcerting for those seeking order in this area, as they mostly
appear to represent failed attempts to lure a court into discerning
public policy where no public policy has been established through
political means.
Taken together, my analysis of these sets of cases can lead to a
more orderly framework for understanding them, as I illustrate in
Figure 1.
Figure 1
Percent of Total Public Policy Defense Cases by
Type/Success (n = 103)
Public Policy Defense

Successful
Defense

Defense Rooted in Statute/
Regulation
Defense Rooted in General
Appeal to Public Policy
Hybrid of Both14

“Ruly”

Unsuccessful
Defense
48%

15%

33%
7%

“Somewhat
ruly”

“Unruly”

Other

Figure 1 depicts how often cases in the public policy arena tend to
fall into the categories I have described. Under my framework,
the truly “unruly” cases seem to present themselves only one-third of
the time.

14. I discuss the seven percent of cases that classify as “hybrids” of both categories of
defense at Part IV.B.4 infra.
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Before detailing my findings below, I explore the baseline of scholarship and conventional wisdom about the public policy defense to
offer contrast to my approach and analysis.
II. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ANALYZE THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE
Scholars have paid limited attention15 to the judicial invalidation16
of contracts17 on public policy grounds. Moreover, much of this attention was granted over forty years ago.18 Although the literature
touches upon the role of judicially discerned public policy, both in
contract and elsewhere in private law, very few scholars have focused
purely on the public policy problem in contracts. As noted in the Introduction here, no systematic empirical efforts have been made to
explore the nuances of the public policy defense. Only two comprehensive19 structural taxonomies of the defense have been presented
over the past fifty years, and one of these was a note in the Harvard
Law Review.20
A. Formal Discussions in the Literature
Aside from the taxonomies discussed in those two works, scholars
have directed their efforts in the public policy arena to broader exam-

15. See Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts,
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 483, 488 (2010) (acknowledging that “commentary on this issue has
been sparse” in light of the frequency with which the public policy defense seems to appear
in contracts opinions).
16. Though I use terms like “public policy defense,” “invalidation,” and even “attack”
on a contract, I am always referring to enforceability in the public policy context.
17. Note the term “contracts against public policy” presents an internal contradiction.
See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern
Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116 n.4 (1988). Contracts, by definition, are agreements that carry legal obligations. Contracts voided on public policy grounds carry no legal
obligations, therefore eviscerating their status as contracts. They are merely agreements.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty.”); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12) (2007).
18. See, e.g., Shand, supra note 3. Furmston’s 1966 article, supra note 9, and a law
review note appear to be the only comprehensive formal scholarship exclusively directed to
the breadth of the subject and the formulation of a framework for understanding the defense. See Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2006) [hereinafter A Law and Economics Look]. Some other older, but
notable works include Winfield, supra note 1 (a compelling historical study of the underpinnings of public policy); George A. Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12
HASTINGS L.J. 347 (1961) (discussing a raft of then-recent California cases in an attempt to
describe the defense in an uncertain zone of conflicting rules and exceptions); and John W.
Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 261
(1947) (discussing the remedial challenges presented by different types of cases).
19. In some instances, the public policy defense has been addressed within a narrower
substantive category of cases. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The
Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259 (1990).
20. See Furmston, supra note 20; A Law and Economics Look, supra note 18.
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inations and justifications for the defense.21 In more recent instances,
scholars have addressed the thorny problems of finding appropriate
remedies22 and the role of the public policy defense in promoting efficient deterrence of undesirable behavior.23 Others have focused their
study more narrowly on a specific zone of the application of the defense, attempting to illuminate the defense with specific subject matter.24 These contributions to the literature all loom large because of
the sheer absence of commentary about this complex problem.
Because this Article’s goal is to develop a new taxonomy and a
new predictive model for these cases based on a systematic study,
I focus briefly on two articles that provided broad taxonomies
to offer some contrasts with the approach I developed through a
consistent observation.
1. Furmston Taxonomy
In 1966, M.P. Furmston proposed, in perhaps the most comprehensive effort to taxonomize this defense in the scholarly literature, a
scheme for understanding public policy cases in contract.25 He tried
to address the gap in the literature left by commentators that tended
to “overgeneralize the effect of cases” and “oversimplify the subject.”26
Furmston divided the cases into five classes: “contracts which are
legal but whose enforcement is affected by considerations of public
policy,”27 “contracts to do an improper act,”28 “contracts for improper
trafficking in inaction,”29 “contracts with an improper tendency,”30
and, “contracts for the supply of materials for impropriety.”31 Even
though the study is nearly a half-century old, Furmston’s effort remains the most recent broad and extensive scholarly attempt to organize this defense.
21. See Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935);
Winfield, supra note 1; Shand, supra note 3. Shand discerned three justifications for the
defense—the punitive justification, the “pure fountain” justification, and the deterrence
justification. The “pure fountain” interest describes a court’s unwillingness to enforce dirty
agreements. Shand, supra note 3, at 148-57.
22. See Wade, supra note 18; Badawi, supra note 15.
23. See Kostritsky, supra note 17.
24. See Dan L. McNeal, Judicially Determined Public Policy: Is “The Unruly Horse”
Loose in Michigan?, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 143 (1996) (an illustration of how the public
policy defense has been applied in narrow private law areas within one state); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J.
259 (1990) (using arbitration cases to illuminate the challenges presented by the public
policy defense).
25. See generally Furmston, supra note 9.
26. Id. at 308.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 308-09.
30. Id. at 309.
31. Id.
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Stating modest goals, Furmston “sought [not] to give a definitive
account of illegal contracts but [only] to explore more closely certain
aspects of the topic.”32 He attempted to remedy the “overgeneralization” of commentators who had addressed this subject, with a new
categorization scheme accompanied by case analysis.33 Furmston cautioned that his ultimate classifications were “still tentative” and admitted that “it may be that further analysis will reveal other classes”
because his exploration only involved analysis of the “leading cases.”34 In the decades that followed his publication, nobody appears
to have taken Furmston’s invitation to look further in the broad way
he had.
Furmston’s tentative classification, however, though a notable
step forward in a dark area, could not offer a complete description of
the landscape of public policy cases precisely because it was based on
the “leading cases,” rather than the ordinary.35 Moreover, Furmston
set out to uncover more classes of cases when perhaps a better understanding of the defense required something other than a more detailed classification. As I describe below, the commentators and the
Restatement of Contracts seemed to accomplish this end, albeit providing limited value for developing a broader theory of the defense.
The Furmston scheme was never tested to see if it would help explain or predict the case law in this uncertain area. In an area of law
compared to an unruly animal, unsurprisingly, few cases can be
found that truly lead. Certain public policy cases are famous, like the
gestational surrogacy contracts opinions in the Baby M case36 and
Johnson v. Calvert.37 But these cases are often better used to trigger
debate about how to think about the limits of freedom of contract
than to explain how courts will address public policy defense cases that
present more routinely.
2. Law and Economics Taxonomy
More recently, a Harvard Law Review note served to support a
law and economics justification for “void for public policy” doctrine—
that is, the public policy defense.38 The taxonomy used for that pur32. Id. at 308.
33. Id. Furmston comes close to apologizing for not offering more than this, but his
scheme is nonetheless a major contribution and the most robust framework in the literature. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (invalidating gestational surrogacy contracts on public policy grounds).
37. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that gestational surrogacy cases do not violate
public policy).
38. See A Law and Economics Look, supra note 18, at 1446. The note concluded that
“[w]elfare-minded judges making decisions under the [void against public policy] doctrine
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pose divided the cases into four distinct categories that cast the cases
by the nature of the contract at issue—whether the contract was to
commit an act “definitely against public policy,”39 to “refrain from
acts that further public policy,”40 to “commit legal acts that themselves facilitate acts against public policy,”41 and to perform acts with
uncertain public policy effects.42
Although this taxonomy admirably attempted to impose order on
the field through the lens of another discipline, ultimately, a portion
of decisions could not be effectively predicted and categorized by this
scheme. The last category, agreements to “perform acts with uncertain public policy effects,” appeared to stump the authors.
What should a court do when the acts to be performed will have
“uncertain public policy effects”? The answer seems to elude a complete solution from a law-and-economics approach, as exemplified in
the note’s struggle to find a clear solution for handling indemnity
clauses.43 As noted in the content analysis in Part IV, indemnity and
exculpation (and limitation and shifting of damages generally) prove
fertile grounds for the public policy defense.44 Failure to satisfactorily
explain this subject matter leaves a hole in this approach, even
though the rest of the analysis makes a contribution.45
Both of these categorization approaches built their foundations on
exemplary cases, rather than a straightforward survey and evaluation of cases coming through the system. This leaves room for exploring the latter approach.

must consider a wide variety of factors, paying attention to, among other things, the possibility of overdeterrence, the relative cost of contractual nonenforcement versus direct punishment of the underlying activity, and the parties’ relative levels of knowledge. The problem’s complexity in turn demands that courts applying the doctrine take a systematic, explicit approach, as only then can there be any hope that they will appropriately balance the
interests inherent in the decision.” Id. The note suggested “a tentative law and economics
taxonomy for the field, discuss[ed] potential reasons to enforce contracts despite their negative externalities, and consider[ed] ramifications of potential remedies [in order] to take a
first step toward solidifying that approach.” Id. In summary, the note identified the messiness of the contracts and public policy area and attempted to use law and economics to
illuminate the problem in an attempt to organize it. Id.
39. Id. at 1449.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1458-60.
43. Id.
44. In my sample, twenty-nine percent of the cases involved some flavor of addressing
whether an exculpatory or indemnity clause was valid. I later categorize these as “agreements that limit or shift liability” or “damage limitation” cases. See infra Table 2.
45. The damage limitations cases I studied appear to be explained by whether the
clause runs contrary to a statute or regulation or whether it does not. A thorough law-andeconomics analysis of these cases would prove fruitful, but the predictive factor seems to be
quite basic.
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B. Treatises and Commentary
Because the academic literature is somewhat sparse, a brief scan
of the treatises and commentaries can provide some insight into the
way cases involving this defense have been ordered. The major treatises
provide extensive categorization schemes for the application of the
defense. The schemes are driven both by subject matter of the
underlying contract (Corbin most extensively does this) and by the
nature of the relationship between the illegal act and the contract, which
Williston attempted.
Though these categories and catalogues provide excellent descriptions of the application of the defense, they do not offer a robust predictive framework for where the defense will likely be more successful and where it might be more orderly. Williston suggests that if a
bargain comports with the “modern view” of the successful public policy defense (essentially the balancing/weighing test also expressed in
the Restatement), the contract will be held unenforceable.46 (Given
Williston’s role in drafting the first Restatement of Contracts, one
would expect this convergence of approach.)
As I note in my discussion of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in Part IV.B, I found in my examination of the cases that
courts rarely put the Willistonian “weighing/balancing” approach into
practice. The treatises and commentary provide a solid descriptive
foundation of the case law and commentary about the public policy
defense, but they leave room for more and better ordering. They are
worth noting because their approach seems to embody much of the
established wisdom about the defense—that it is indeed “unruly,”
and difficult to summarize doctrinally.
For example, the Corbin treatise’s treatment of the public policy
defense is exhaustive and almost scientific in the way it catalogued
every identifiable species and subspecies of the defense. It leaves the
impression that the defense is dependent on the minutiae of every
conceivable underlying subject matter addressed in a public policy
case. Corbin also expressly and appropriately concedes the difficulty
of discerning public policy.47

46. See 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 4, § 12:1, at 744-52.
47. 15 GIESEL, supra note 4, at § 79.3 (“Courts often use the two alliterative words
‘public policy’ as if they had a magic quality and were self-explanatory. . . . But judges also
have the job of evaluating public policy even in the absence of such sources. The entire
body of what is described as the common law is the result of innumerable court decisions
based upon the judicial notions of sound social policy and human welfare. In situations in
which the legislature has not spoken on an issue, or in situations in which the legislature
has been unclear, or in situations in which there are, perhaps, inconsistent statements by
the legislature, how does a court determine whether a contract contradicts public policy?
The difficulty of the court’s task has long been recognized.”) (emphasis added).
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In his survey of contracts found to violate public policy, Corbin
detailed twenty-six different types of “contracts in restraint of competition,”48 seven types of “contracts involving familial relationships,”49
three types of “Sunday contracts,”50 eighteen “bargains harmful to
the administration of justice,”51 nine “bargains harmful to the public
service or to the performance of [a] fiduciary duty,”52 nineteen “bargains to defraud or otherwise injure third persons,”53 twenty-two different types of “wagering bargains,”54 fifteen types of “usury bargains,”55 and nine “miscellaneous bargains contrary to public policy.”56 Corbin’s treatise reads a bit like Charles Darwin’s The Zoology
of the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle,57 counting 128 different subspecies of
the public policy defense in action. Though, in some sense, Corbin’s
work could prove to be a helpful guide to those trying to identify if a
certain defense had been employed before, it does not provide any
sense of the frequency with which these cases are pled, nor does it provide us with a sense of where courts are more likely to void a contract.
Corbin contributes a concrete descriptive structure, but he also
attempts to provide predictive help in one section of his treatise by
noting that there may be distinctions between contracts that involve
conduct that is malum in se versus conduct that is malum prohibitum.58 Even there Corbin acknowledges that “many judges have said
that the distinction between contracts relating to malum in se
conduct and contracts relating to malum prohibitum conduct has
been ‘exploded.’ ”59
Though organized differently, the Williston treatise provides a detailed analysis of the public policy defense and offers some broad
guidance about the situations where one could expect the defense to
succeed—and does not go far beyond that point.60 The treatise makes
a concededly broad claim that:
48. Id. § 80.
49. Id. § 81.
50. Id. § 82. These contracts are a leftover from an era when the law in some states
prohibited business transactions on Sunday.
51. Id. § 83.
52. Id. § 84.
53. Id. § 85.
54. Id. § 86.
55. Id. § 87.
56. Id. § 88.
57. See, e.g., 4 CHARLES DARWIN, THE WORKS OF CHARLES DARWIN, THE ZOOLOGY OF
THE VOYAGE OF H. M. S. BEAGLE, PART I: FOSSIL MAMMALIA, PART II: MAMMALIA (Paul H.
Barrett & R.B. Freeman eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1987) (1839).
58. 15 GIESEL, supra note 4, § 79.5.
59. Id.
60. 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 4, § 12:1, at 742 (“[I]n this treatise, the appropriate inquiry is limited to determining in what cases and to what extent the law denies, for
reasons of public policy, to technically complete bargains, the usual characteristics of contractual obligations and legal force.”).
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[A] bargain will be declared illegal or unenforceable if:
1. The consideration for a promise in it is an illegal act or forbearance;
2. It is illegal to make some promise in the bargain, even though
what is promised might be legally performed;
3. Some performance promised is illegal;
4. A provision is included for a condition in violation of law; or
5. According to the modern view, embodied in the Restatement
Second, “the interest in enforcement [of a promise or term] is
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against
the enforcement of such terms,” in which case the term will
be unenforceable.61

Though this categorization scheme is more abstract, Williston
(like Corbin) also provides extensive lists of examples62 of the “various foundations of public policy,”63 and the “[l]imits of judicial recognition of public policy.”64 Like other treatises, however, it does not
provide a census that reveals the frequency of the subject matter of
the cases or which flavors of the defense are more successful. The
treatise does enter into some discussion of the first and second Restatements of Contracts, discussing where the Restatements work
well and where it does not, also using anecdotal descriptions.65 (As I
note in Part IV.B below, the role of the Restatement is minimal today.) Though mentioning the “ ‘unruly horse,’ ”66 Williston did not
attempt to tame it within the confines of his treatise.
The hornbooks, in pursuit of the simplicity that is their purpose,
also seem to accept the unruly horse metaphor. Calamari and Perillo
explicitly refrained in their hornbook from claiming that they were
offering a comprehensive view of the “various kinds of contracts or
contract clauses that have been struck down on grounds of public policy.”67 The authors focused instead on the consequences of an agreement struck down on this basis68—a valuable contribution, but one
that leaves readers bereft of an analysis of the scenarios that lead to
these consequences.
The treatises and commentaries can be bolstered by a complete
discussion of the defense as actually employed today, informed by

61. Id. at 744-52.
62. It could be characterized as a carefully-crafted laundry list, though Williston does
not appear to be as comprehensive as Corbin.
63. Id. § 12:2, at 687.
64. Id. § 12:3, at 858.
65. Id. § 12:4.
66. Id. § 12:2, at 776 (quoting Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2
Bing 229, 252 (Burrough J.)).
67. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 22.1, at 843.
68. Id.
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case law.69 After briefly discussing the Restatement, I attempt to
supplement the traditional analysis of the defense with a systematic
view of what types of claims succeed more often—and where there
might be other meaningful distinctions between these types of cases.
C. Restatement of Contracts
As noted, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 178(1),
suggests that courts should “weigh” or balance factors that are more
expressly delineated in subsections (2) and (3).
§ 178. When a Term is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in
the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of
such terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account
is taken of
(a) the parties’ justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied,
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or
judicial decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further
that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to
which it was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between the misconduct and
the term.70

To contextualize this “weighing” approach, the Restatement lays
out a specific list of the bases of public policies against enforcement,
one which is more specific, detailed, and content-driven than conceptual.71 The Restatement recognizes that public policy can be raised by
69. Id. Calamari and Perillo focused on executory bilateral contracts, id. § 22.2; licensing statutes (as this Article does), id. § 22.3; the remoteness of the illegality, id. § 22.4;
fiduciaries, id. § 22.5; divisibility, id. § 22.6; restitution, id. §§ 22.7-22.8; change in law or
facts after the bargain (this Article discusses a case in this category, infra pp. 57-59, Lucky
Jack’s Entm’t Ctr. v. Jopat Bldg. Corp.), id. § 22.9; and with some specificity, illegal attorney agreements, id. § 22.10.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981) (emphasis added).
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179.
Bases Of Public Policies Against Enforcement
A public policy against the enforcement of promises or other terms may be derived by the court from
(a) legislation relevant to such a policy, or
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legislation, “the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare, as
is the case for the judicial policies against, for example . . . restraint
of trade[,] . . . impairment of family relations[,] . . . [and] interference
with other protected interests.”72 These bases are all folded into the
more elaborate balancing tests that cover all other situations that
arise with public policy.73
The Restatement framework, however, does not aid much with
broader categorization or predictability. As I describe in Part IV.B,
courts rarely cited Restatement section 178 in the set of cases that I
examined and they rarely applied the conceptual “weighing” approach, which raises questions about its utility. In an “unruly” area,
one would expect courts to seek refuge in some source of authority.
The Restatement does not provide that authority in practice nor does
it appear to reflect the manner in which today’s courts handle cases.
To test the usefulness of the Restatement, and to test the other
conventional wisdom about the defense, I describe the mechanism I
devised to isolate a consistent set of relevant public policy cases in
Part III. In order to discern any order out of the public policy defense,
the run of cases must be examined closely, which I do in Part IV.
Though efforts have been made, as I have just noted, to categorize
cases conceptually in some effort to bring order to the defense, no
scholar has done so by looking at the problem from the bottom up.
Before analyzing the public policy defense cases, I set out first to
identify them.
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE AS EMPLOYED
A content analysis of recent cases involving the public policy defense to a contract reveals that this public policy problem might appear to be a slightly more “ruly” horse than Judge Burrough posited.
No previous scholarship has attempted systematically to sift through

(b) the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare, as is the case for the
judicial policies against, for example,
(i) restraint of trade
(ii) impairment of family relations, and
(iii) interference with other protected interests.
For more detail on restraint of trade, see id. §§ 186-88, for family relations, see id. §§ 18991, and for “other protected interests,” see id. §§ 192-96, 356. See also id. § 181. “Effect Of
Failure To Comply With Licensing Or Similar Requirement.” Related sections of the first
Restatement addressed bargains to “Refrain From Committing a Wrong,” RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 578 (1932), “Bargains Concerning Domestic Relations,” id. §§ 58189, and “Bargains Tending to Defraud or Injure Third Persons,” id. §§ 571-79.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179.
73. See id. § 178(1).
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public policy cases to examine their content.74 A number of questions
remain extant, however. With what relative frequency does the public policy challenge involve the violation or contravention of an established regulation or statute as opposed to a generalized call to prevent an odious public consequence of enforcement? Do courts go
through the weighing and balancing exercises suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 178?75 How often does this
defense succeed and does it succeed in certain contexts more than
others? This Article sets out to answer these questions and others by
evaluating and categorizing six months of cases from 200976 in every
United States jurisdiction that could be deemed as a pure challenge77
to a contract on public policy grounds.
The identification of cases involving the public policy defense required the casting of a wide net in order to be inclusive and then the
application of a tight sorting process to purify the set of judicial opinions to ensure that they were relevant to the analysis.78 The goal was
to produce a consistent set of cases that addressed the defense apart
from separate and distinct doctrines, as I explain. First, I searched
for opinions in the “All Federal & State Cases” Westlaw database for
a six-month period ranging between July 1, 2009, and December 31,
2009, in order to capture activity in courts of all levels in every jurisdiction. The search terms used within this database were “contract &
‘public policy’ & defense.” This broad query within a large base of
cases returned a total of 1,089 opinions, mostly unpublished opinions.
I also used the search term “illegal contract” within the same
timeframe. This “illegal contract” search yielded only sixty opinions,
a few of which overlapped with the primary search.
I read all of the opinions to determine if they met certain, specific
criteria to qualify for analysis as a “pure” public policy defense case.
For a case to qualify for analysis, the opinion had to (a) involve a contractual issue, (b) address and (c) resolve the public policy defense.
With respect to (c), included is the notion that courts can sua sponte
74. I accepted David Snyder’s invitation to “go out and look” at the cases. David V.
Snyder, Go Out and Look: The Challenge and Promise of Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2006).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (“A promise or other term of an
agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is
unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances
by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.”).
76. Published and unpublished within the Westlaw database. This project commenced
in earnest in mid-2010, so these dates presented a logical starting point.
77. See infra this Part for an explanation of what I deemed to be a “pure challenge.”
78. My simplified approach was heavily, but not exclusively, influenced by the basic
techniques discussed in ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN,
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW (2010) (describing methods in data gathering and evaluation)
and in Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63 (2008) (discussing the empirical method of content analysis).
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address illegality or public policy concerns and invalidate a contract,
the justification being that parties mutually involved in illegal activity may not have the incentive to plead the defense—and that the
public good must nonetheless be served.79 I included unpublished
(and even modified and overruled) opinions in my final analysis because my objective was to get a solid cross-sectional view of how the
defense is really used in action. I was not concerned about the precedential value of these cases—nor was I concerned with what might
have happened to these specific cases on appeal. I intended to review
a consistent set of opinions from a defined period of time that would
demonstrate how courts handle the defense at every level, every day,
from barebones, unpublished state trial court opinions to elaborate,
published federal appellate opinions.
Additionally, to further distill the set of cases, I removed opinions
that litigated public policy in the context of arbitration,80 restraint of
trade,81 noncompete agreements,82 choice of law questions,83 and employment discharge challenges.84
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (1981) (“Even if
neither party’s pleading or proof reveals the contravention [of public policy], the court may
ordinarily inquire into it and decide the case on the basis of it if it finds it just to do so,
subject to any relevant rules of pleading or proof by which it is bound.”).
80. For descriptions of the distinct flavor of public policy in the arbitration zone see,
for example, Harvey R. Boller & Donald J. Petersen, Applying the Public Policy-Exception
to Labor Arbitration Awards, 58 DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004 at 14, 16; Christopher S. Gibson, Arbitration, Civilization and Public Policy: Seeking Counterpoise Between
Arbitral Autonomy and the Public Policy Defense in View of Foreign Mandatory Public
Law, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1227, 1230-31 (2009); Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration, Bankruptcy,
and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503, 503 (2009),
and Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22
ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 263 (1990). The United States Supreme Court addressed the public
policy defense and enforceability in E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57,
61-67 (2000). Justice Thomas also addressed the defense in the context of the Federal Arbitration
Act in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 1740, 1753-56 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring.).
81. The Restatement notes that restraint-of-trade cases are well-established in common law and statute. These cases have a life apart from plain-vanilla public policy defense
cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 2, intro. note:
The common law’s policy against restraint of trade is one of its oldest and
best established. Nevertheless . . . , that policy is severely circumscribed . . . .
. . . Although activities such as organizing a corporation or refusing to deal with
another may be in restraint of trade, they are outside the scope of this Restatement if no promise is involved. . . However, a promise to organize a corporation or to refuse to deal comes within its purview.
[Also,] the Restatement does not deal with those aspects of the subject that
are largely legislative. . . . Promises in restraint of trade are governed by extensive federal and state statutes, under which the promise may not only be unenforceable, as at common law, but may give rise to both civil and criminal responsibility. The substance of that legislation is beyond the scope of this Restatement. With respect to most aspects of the restraint of trade, federal legislation has so completely occupied the field as to make the common law rules of
little or no consequence except as they may give meaning to some of the more
general terms of that legislation. Examples are the creation of monopoly, the
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In each of these cases, I justified the exclusions on the judgment
that the jurisprudence appeared to be especially dominated by the
substantive subject matter, leaving less room for judicial discretion
than in other public policy defense cases.85 For example, the
challenges to arbitration clauses and enforcement of arbitration decisions
are strongly tied to interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, which
effectively declared a national public policy.86 The use of the term “public
policy” extends over a range of cases involving contractual enforcement.
I attempted to isolate the cases to yield opinions where courts
wrestle with pure public policy defenses that stand apart from any
other doctrine.87 Certainly, different selection criteria and categories
substantial lessening of competition by, for example, tying purchases of one
product to another, or the imposition of non-ancillary restraints controlling
prices or limiting production. Specific aspects of the subject may also be governed by state statutes.
82. The Restatement places these cases within the public policy bucket, but they also
have a distinct flavor by profession and by jurisdiction. The noise within this bucket would
overpower any insights from the “pure cases.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
186(2) (“A promise is in restraint of trade if its performance would limit competition in any
business or restrict the promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation.”). But these cases
tend to follow different policy lines in different professions, like law and medicine. See Robert Steinbuch, Why Doctors Shouldn’t Practice Law: The American Medical Association’s
Misdiagnosis of Physician Non-Compete Clauses, 74 MO. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (2009). Also,
the cases tend to be enforced differently in (1) different industries (see, e.g., Emily E. Duke,
Mary M. Krakow & Sarah M. Gibbs, Creating Enforceable Noncompete Agreements with
Bank Officers and Other Key Employees, 126 BANKING L.J. 248, 250 (2009)); (2) states (see,
e.g., John M. Norwood, Non Compete Agreements in Arkansas: Can They Be Enforced?,
2009 ARK. L. NOTES 141 (2009); Kevin R. Eberle, Eroding Disfavor of Non-Competes and
the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine in South Carolina, S. C. LAW., Nov. 2008 at 13, 13)); and
(3) at the intersection of states and industries (see, e.g., Melissa Ilyse Rassas, Comment,
Explaining the Outlier: Oregon’s New Non-Compete Agreement Law & the Broadcasting
Industry, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 447, 447-48 (2009) (discussing a new Oregon law that revised
the approach to noncompetes within the broadcasting industry in that state)).
83. For a comprehensive set of examples that demonstrate that these cases are often
decided on issues unique to choice of law, apart from plain public policy, see Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey,
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 355-58, 364-79, 389 (2011).
84. Challenges on public policy grounds to at-will employment terminations focus on
the public policy implications of the discharge, not the underlying contract. See, e.g.,
Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Wis. 2000).
85. See infra Part V.B. for further discussion of the role of judicial discretion in application of the public policy defense.
86. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2011). In Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984), Chief Justice Burger interpreted § 2 of the Act to mean that Congress
had established national public policy in this arena. Id. at 10 (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”). This declared public policy would cloud any
analysis of how courts make these decisions when there is no such bold declaration (by
statute or by the Supreme Court) on point.
87. I did, however, include examples involving unlicensed contractors, even though
they may have a flavor of their own, as I discuss in Part IV.A.1. There is not a separate
doctrine per se that covers these cases, but they do nicely and neatly embody statutory/regulatory conflict with a private bargain.
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of cases could be justified for an analysis of the public policy defense
like the one I present here. For other purposes, choices of inclusion
and exclusion could be adjusted to either expand or restrict the scope
of what I examined. This analysis aspires to serve as a point of departure for different approaches with different purposes.
After completing the process I devised for selecting cases, I identified 103 opinions from this period at the state and federal level that
met the criteria.88 Though the sample I used here may be slightly
smaller when compared with similar studies,89 some definitive conclusions can still be drawn with statistical significance.90 The sample
affords a valid description of the defense as modernly litigated.
With this data set in place, I set out to find whether there was order to be found within these cases. Was this “horse” as “unruly” as
Judge Burrough and subsequent scholars and judges believed? Were
there different breeds of horses that were more “unruly” than others?
Given that there has not been a systematic look at these cases, this
Article attempts to answer those questions in a modest, directional
way by examining a slice of them.
IV. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW
I set out to evaluate the set of opinions that I had isolated to see if
any patterns emerged that could enable ordering of a defense labeled
“very unruly.” The first question I raised and addressed was how often the public policy defense was successful when pled and resolved.
In the cases examined, the underlying contract was successfully attacked in 46 out of 103 instances. (Put another way, this constitutes a
forty-five percent success rate for the public policy defense in “voiding” the contract.) Given that this defense to contract worked roughly
half of the time, we can assume that this is a vibrant defense to contract enforcement when raised. In the aggregate, however, this finding does not answer the question about whether “unruliness” is the
norm in this corner of contract doctrine.
88. Within this sample, no appeals appeared of cases decided within this short
timeframe.
89. Robert Hillman built his well-known study of promissory estoppel on 362 cases.
See Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 582-83 n.15 (1998). One other recent
study of promissory estoppel analyzed 383 cases. See Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of
Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
57 UCLA L. REV. 669, 687 (2010). A study of unconscionability used a data set of 187 cases,
a number in the neighborhood of this study of the public policy defense. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of
Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1092-93 (2006).
90. As discussed infra Part IV, note 91, the sample in this Article provides enough
data to yield statistically-significant results at the level of distinguishing the outcomes
between defenses rooted in statutes and regulations and defenses rooted in broader appeals to public policy.
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At a summary level, the content analysis revealed a significant difference in outcome between cases that invoked a statute or regulation
as the basis for the public policy defense and cases that invoked a
broader public policy claim. Additionally, the cases in both categories
almost unanimously avoid any balancing of interests, as suggested by
the Restatement, in the analysis that leads to the outcome.
I first separated the cases into two categories. Although categorizing
cases can be a challenging and subtle exercise, a sizable number of
these cases can be cast as attacks based on the underlying agreement’s
contravention or undermining of a statute or regulation. The remainder of the cases can be classified as an attack on the contract based on
broader, more general public policy grounds and interests. Comparing
these two categories reveals a primary distinction that may help bring
some order to an understanding of the public policy defense. Where an
attack on a contract is based more closely on contravention of a statute
or regulation, the contract appears more likely to fall victim to the attack. In such cases, we find that there is success with the public policy
gambit nearly twice as frequently than with the broader cases.91
Table 1
Success of Defense by Category of Defense
Category of Public
Policy Defense to
Contract92

Total
Cases

“Successful”
Cases (Where
defense succeeds)

Success
Rate

Defense Rooted in
Statute/Regulation

49

29

59%

Defense Rooted in
General Appeal to
Public Policy

49

15

31%

Hybrid of Both

5

2

40%

103

46

45%

Total

91. When the “hybrid” cases are stripped out, we see that the differences in result
between statute/regulation and broader public policy are statistically significant. Running
a chi square test, the two variables are not independent. X2 = 8.08425, DF=1, p=0.004465.
92. Cases that presented a hybrid defense were categorized into statute/regulation or
broader public policy if they leaned heavily in one direction or the other. Those that fit into
neither category were determined to be hybrids.
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A. Contravention of Statutory/Regulation Cases
As I describe below, the statutory and regulatory contravention
cases run the gamut from the government voiding an agreement
forged through bribery of an undercover agent to parties trying to
collect on a bargain for services provided by them without legally required licensure. As noted above, but worth emphasizing again because of the primacy of this finding, the public policy defense to contract appears to be roughly twice as successful in this context.
Methodologically, I include in this category public policy opinions
that involve a statute or regulation and reference it as the source of
the public policy. In these cases, the public policy is constructed
through a political process,93 not an adjudicative process. In my descriptions of these cases, which immediately follow, I only include
public policy defenses that prove successful because, in these cases,
the court would be compelled to perform a more complete public policy analysis.94 To provide a flavor of the defense in action, I describe
some licensure cases, then some cases that involve a criminal statute
and, finally, cases that involve agreements to limit or shift liability
(e.g., exculpatory clauses). Table 2 breaks down the cases involving
agreements that contravene statute or regulation.

93. Or “nonjudicial” process. I categorize regulatory cases as political.
94. In analysis of the broader category of cases, I do describe unsuccessful attempts to
invoke the defense because unsuccessful attempts dominate that category.
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Table 2
Success by Type of Defense Involving Contravention of
Statute or Regulation
Direct Contravention of Statute/
Regulation Cases

Total Cases

“Successful”
Cases

Success
Rate

Agreements Counter
to Licensure or Code

12

9

75%

“Criminal
Agreements”

7

4

57%

Agreements That
Limit or Shift
Liability

12

7

58%

Other

18

9

50%

Total Direct Contravention of Statute/
Regulation95

49

29

59%

1. Contracting Counter to Licensure
A common circumstance where the public policy defense is invoked involves scenarios where a service of value has been provided
to the defendant but the service was performed in contravention of a
code, or more commonly, the work was performed without proper licensure. Even though these opinions have their own distinct flavor,
in some respect like the arbitration or restraint of trade cases, I include them because they embody a frequent public policy defense
that cleanly invokes the argument that enforcement of the contract
runs contrary to statute.
The licensing cases directly raise two important issues. First,
should a court enforce a contract when a party performs an obligation
but fails to comply appropriately with statutory or regulatory licensing requirements? Second, how should courts balance the tension between upholding the public policy purpose of a statute with inflicting
significant forfeiture on the unlicensed party? These questions cut to
the core of what courts must encounter when handling the public pol95. One case is counted in both the “illegal” and “contravention of statute/regulation”
categories.

584

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:563

icy defense in a scenario where a statute or regulation expressly
speaks to the problem.
During the time period of the search, twelve licensure opinions fell
into this category—contracting counter to regulation or code. The defense to contract enforcement succeeded in nine of these cases.
Though this study does not have enough data to fully confirm this, a
strong hypothesis would lie in that these cases are especially “ruly.”
The more granular separation of cases displayed in Table 3 shows
that the defense in this context stands apart, even from the other
cases that contravene statutes and regulations.
Table 3
Separating Licensure/Code Cases from Other Direct
Contravention Cases
Direct Contravention of Statute/
Regulation

Total Cases

“Successful”
Cases

Success
Rate

Agreements
counter to
licensure or code

12

9

75%

Other direct
contravention of
statute/regulation

37

20

54%

Total

49

29

59%

Section 181 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Effect of
Failure to Comply with Licensing or Similar Requirement”) purports
to address these circumstances.96 Though not frequently cited by
name,97 the spirit behind this section of the Restatement appears
96. This section provides:
If a party is prohibited from doing an act because of his failure to comply
with a licensing, registration or similar requirement, a promise in consideration of his doing that act or of his promise to do it is unenforceable
on grounds of public policy if
(a) the requirement has a regulatory purpose, and
(b) the interest in the enforcement of the promise is clearly outweighed by the public policy behind the requirement.
97. As of June 11, 2011, Westlaw only counted forty-four total historical case citations
or mentions—and none within the timeframe of the case search I conducted. One reason for
the paucity of citations to section 181 might lie in the fact that the licensing statutes often
speak explicitly to contract enforceability questions and parties and courts plead “public
policy” as a defense, quickly pointing to the relevant statutory text—not the Restatement.
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very much alive and remains a vibrant basis for a defense to contract.
The public policy defense to contract that invokes a failure to comply
with licensing appears to succeed quite often.98 I also include similar
cases that appear to invoke compliance with a regulation or code.99
The balancing test suggested by section 181(b) (that an agreement
will be unenforceable if the “interest in . . . enforcement is . . . clearly
outweighed by the public policy . . . .”) does not seem to be explicitly
or implicitly invoked in the cases I examined. Courts appear to undo
bargains directly and with little hesitation when this particular
species of the public policy defense is raised, often, but not always,
eschewing quasi-contract remedies. With this category—and with
others—I try to inject some vibrancy into the analysis by providing
descriptions of some of the successful invocations of the defense, as the
judicial reasoning tends to be more explicit in these circumstances.
(a) Halpern v. Greene
A colorful example of the public policy defense in action was described in an unpublished opinion from a lower court in New York. In
Halpern v. Greene,100 a boxer, Greene, challenged the enforceability of
a personal services management agreement the boxer had struck
with two managers.101 The managers, unlicensed as boxing managers
by the state of New York, were trying to collect on the agreement,
claiming that a valid contract existed.102 Over time the managers had
paid for thirteen of the boxer’s first fourteen fights, including expenses relating to travel, promotion, and publicity providing the purses
for the boxers.103 The managers invested significant effort through
contacts and negotiations to enable Greene to achieve “a Top Ten
World Ranking,” while attempting to cut deals with major promoters

See, e.g., Davis Moreno Constr., Inc. v. Frontier Steel Bldgs. Corp., No. CV-F-08-854
OWW/SMS, slip op. (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2009).
98. See, e.g., id.; KLW Enters. v. W. Ala. Commercial Indus., 31 So. 3d 136 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2009); Mousa v. Saba, 222 Ariz. 581 (Ct. App. 2009); Balt. St. Builders v. Stewart, 975
A.2d 271 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); Webb ex rel. Webb v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 218 P.3d
1239 (Nev. 2009) (finding in part that unlicensed provision of services amounting to practice of psychology were not enforceable in contract); Talented IT, Inc. v. Data Grp., Inc. No
L-10232-07, 2009 WL 3488465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct 28, 2009); Halpern v. Greene,
No. 108302/2008, 2009 WL 2972386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 2009).
99. Often, these cases involve construction and compliance with permits and building
codes. See, e.g., White v. Cridlebaugh, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434 (Ct. App. 2009); Mid-Ohio
Mech., Inc. v. Eisenmann Corp., Nos. 07 CA 000035, 08 CA 00012, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 2, 2009) (involving unsuccessful challenge to contract using this flavor of the public
policy defense where the court would not permit unknowing subcontractor to fall victim to
general contractor’s failure to license).
100. Halpern, 2009 WL 2972386.
101. Id. at *1-3.
102. Id. at *3.
103. Id. at *2.
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to get Greene into televised matches.104 The managers also procured
Greene a $1000 per week contract for the boxer to spar with another
boxer.105 According to the pleadings, “[a]s a result of plaintiffs’ efforts,
Greene . . . remained undefeated and rose quickly in the boxing
community, which resulted in his ranking as one of the top ten boxers in the Middleweight Division.”106
The agreement laid out a structure for how Greene would be compensated, and that the managers would receive one-third of the boxer’s income plus reimbursement for expenses relating to travel and
training.107 Ultimately, the promoters would invest $225,000 in
Greene’s career.108
The defendants (Greene’s father was also a defendant)109 challenged the management agreement on the basis that the plaintiffs
were not licensed as promoters, managers, or matchmakers pursuant
to the authority of the New York State Athletic Commission.110 The
defendants also argued that “[e]ven if all proper licenses [were] secured, the regulations do not recognize any management contract
between a boxer and a manager as valid, unless both parties appear
at the same time before the Commission and receive its approval,”111
pursuant to the New York state regulation on boxer-manager contracts.112 Given that the managers failed to meet the requirements of
this regulation, the court was left with no choice but to find the management services contract invalid. The court also noted:
The state regulation of boxing parallel[ed] the federal legislation
encapsulated in the Professional Boxing Safety Act, . . . [which]
emphasize[d] the importance of state regulation of boxing to safeguard “the welfare of professional boxers and serve the public interest.” Both the state and federal regulation of boxing was adopted not as revenue generating measures, but solely for the purpose
of uprooting entrenched repeated occurrences of disreputable, coercive and abusive business practices in the boxing industry.113

Taken altogether, the court refused to enforce the management
agreement in contract because it ran against the public policy of
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *1 n.1.
108. Id. at *2.
109. After his son started to enjoy some success under the direction of the plaintiffs,
the father began to insert himself as a manager. Id.
110. Id. at *3.
111. Id. at *4.
112. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 208.5 (2012) (“A contract is not valid between manager and boxer unless both parties appear at the same time before the commission and receive its approval unless otherwise directed or authorized by the commission. A
copy of all boxer-manager contracts must be filed with the commission for approval.”).
113. Halpern, 2009 WL 2972386.
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New York and the United States as expressed through a state and
federal statute and regulation. Despite this clarity of result on the
challenge to the contract, however, the court welcomed an alternative argument in quasi-contract.114
Ultimately, the Halpern court would not permit the boxer to use
the public policy defense as the proverbial sword rather than a
shield.115 The court refused to dismiss the managers’ claim for unjust
enrichment, leaving open the possibility for the managers to recoup
“direct financial contributions which are separate and apart from any
earnings Greene . . . may have made.”116 Drawing from New York
case law, the court noted that “fee forfeitures are disfavored and
that such forfeitures are perhaps particularly inappropriate when
other regulatory sanctions exist for noncompliance.” 117
In sum, the court refused to enforce an agreement that directly
contravened a statutory/regulatory scheme. But the Halpern court
was nonetheless willing to entertain a claim outside of contract that
would soften the justice of the result. As I explain, courts, however,
are not generally this forgiving to those who form agreements that
similarly run contra to a statute involving a licensing requirement.
(b) Ron Medlin Construction v. Harris
In Ron Medlin Construction v. Harris, the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina decided a construction case involving, at its essence,
an agreement between a general contractor and two individuals for
whom the contractor had built a home.118 At the time the parties entered into the agreement, the plaintiff contractor was unlicensed.119
After completion of the construction of a home valued at $1,300,000—
and after payments from the defendants to the plaintiff of $725,000,
a dispute arose over the remaining balance owed to the contractorplaintiff. The defendants successfully maintained that they did
not owe any additional money in contract because the contractor
was unlicensed.120
This court, however, in contrast to the Halpern court in New York,
would not permit the contractor to pursue a separate cause of action
from the once unlicensed contractor based on implied contract or
quantum meruit. This court characterized the agreement at issue121
114. Id. at *6-7.
115. Id. at *7.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *5 (citing Benjamin v. Koeppel, 85 N.Y.2d 549, 553 (N.Y. 1995)).
118. Ron Medlin Constr. v. Harris, 681 S.E.2d 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
119. Id. at 808.
120. Id. at 810-11.
121. As one might expect with construction disputes, the case involved a set of agreements and relationships between multiple subcontractors, the individual general contrac-
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as an “express contract”122 between the general contractor and the
defendants.123 The Ron Medlin Construction court held that because
the subject matter of the express agreement was essentially the same
as the subject matter of the quantum meruit claim,124 the latter claim
was equally invalid.125
The court looked toward a North Carolina Supreme Court decision, Brady v. Fulghum,126 for a rationale for prohibiting recovery in
any form for unlicensed contractors on public policy grounds. The
Brady court explained, with citations to Corbin’s treatise:
[W]hen a legislature invokes its police power to provide statutory
protection to the public from fraud, incompetence, and irresponsibility, as ours has done with the contractor licensing statutes,
courts impose greater penalties on violators. Making contracts unenforceable by the violating contractor produces “a salutary effect
in causing obedience to the licensing statute.” These public policy
considerations militate against permitting unlicensed general construction contractors to enforce their contracts. Denying the
contractor the right to enforce his contract effectuates the statutory purpose and legislative intent of providing the public with
optimum protection.127

The Ron Medlin Construction court took a completely different
turn than the Halpern court on the quantum meruit question. The
court saw no sense in allowing the plaintiffs to achieve through quantum meruit what they could not achieve through a contract that violated public policy—it would frustrate the same policy interests.128
This result stands apart from the Halpern court’s desire to avoid a
forfeiture, though a distinction could be made on the basis that contractor licensing goes much more toward the essence of a safety policy. The Ron Medlin Construction court acknowledges the drastic implications of the outcome of this case: “If this result seems harsh, our
tor, and his intertwining partnerships. This summary boils down the facts to the essence of
the public policy dispute.
122. The description of this arrangement as a “contract” again runs contrary to the
language of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981): “A contract is a promise or a
set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which
the law in some way recognizes as a duty.” In this instance, the court afforded no remedy,
even if there was a breach.
123. Ron Medlin Constr., 681 S.E.2d at 810.
124. The court so held even though the party making the claim was Ron Medlin Construction, not George Ronald Medlin, individually. George Ronald Medlin was unlicensed
when he entered into the agreement and the court was not willing to allow him to evade
the licensing issue by transferring the agreement to Ron Medlin Construction. Id. at 81011.
125. Id.
126. 308 S.E.2d 327 (N.C. 1983).
127. Ron Medlin Constr., 681 S.E.2d at 810 (citations omitted) (citing Brady, 308
S.E.2d at 331).
128. Id. at 811.
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Supreme Court in Brady has already observed: ‘If, by virtue of these
rules, harsh results fall upon unlicensed contractors who violate our
statutes, the contractors themselves bear both the responsibility and
the blame.’ ”129 The North Carolina courts viewed this harsh result as
necessary for perpetuation of the regulatory scheme and for protecting the public.
Although there seems to be “ruliness” within this category in
terms of declining to enforce contracts that run against licensure, as
reported in section 181 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
how “ruly” are the actual results when factoring in other avenues
for recovery? Are plaintiffs frequently permitted by courts to make
end-runs that permit quantum meruit?
Though I do not have a sample size to make an absolute conclusion, a few states apparently take different postures toward contracts
with unlicensed contractors, notably California, which provides not
just a shield from enforcement of a contract by unlicensed contractors, but also a statutory sword that enables service recipients to disgorge any money conveyed to unlicensed contractors.130 The Halpern
case enabled the unlicensed parties to recover in quasi-contract, but
in the eight other cases where a public policy defense succeeded because the court found that a party ran afoul of licensure,131 no recovery outside of contract was permitted.132 This would offer support for a
hypothesis that the defense proves especially effective in this context.
(c) Baltimore Street Builders v. Stewart
The public policy defense can occasionally have the harsh effect of
shutting out the unlicensed provider from any recovery. In Baltimore

129. Id. (citing Brady, 308 S.E.2d at 332).
130. See Davis Moreno Constr., Inc. v. Frontier Steel Bldgs. Corp., No. CV-F-08-854
OWW/SMS, 2009 WL 1476990, at *20 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (comparing California’s
approach (allowing for disgorgement of moneys from unlicensed contractors) with Colorado’s approach (absence of state-level licensing requirements and no allowance for disgorgement)); White v. Cridlebaugh, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 442-44 (2009) (citing CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 7031(a) (West 2009) (“[N]o person engaged in the business or acting in the
capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in
any action, in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance
of any act or contract where a license is required.”)) (demonstrating application of
the shield).
131. See Davis Moreno Constr., Inc., 2010 WL 4513388; KLW Enters. v. W. Ala. Commercial Indus., 31 So.3d 136 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); Mousa v. Saba, 218 P.3d 1038 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2009); White, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 434; Balt. St. Builders v. Stewart, 975 A.2d 271
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); Webb, ex rel. Webb v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 218 P.3d 1239
(Nev. 2009); Talented IT, Inc. v. Data Group, Inc., 2009 WL 3488465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Oct. 28, 2009); Ron Medlin Constr., 681 S.E.2d 807.
132. In Mousa v. Saba, unjust enrichment was forbidden for services relating to the
licensed activity of real estate brokerage, but the court left open a possibility for recovery in
unjust enrichment for other services. See Mousa, 218 P.3d at 1043.
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Street Builders v. Stewart,133 nearly half of the balance that would
have been due to the unlicensed contractor was left unpaid. The Baltimore Street Builders court explained the justification for the harsh
result by ultimately appealing to section 598 of the Restatement
(First) of Contracts, comment a: “The court’s refusal [to enforce the
agreement] is not for the sake of the defendant, but because it will
not aid such a plaintiff.”134 Explaining the logic for not permitting any
recovery in quasi-contract, “ ‘the contention that there is unjust enrichment of the defendants [is un]tenable. To permit a recovery on a
quantum meruit would defeat and nullify the statute.’ ”135
This corner of the public policy defense seems to be well-ordered,
even within the more measured context of defenses that are based on
a statute or regulation. As I describe next, the justifying theme of
Baltimore Street Builders, namely that courts refrain from enforcement of an illegal contract regardless of the equities, echoes in other
applications of the defense beyond the licensing cases. Courts do not
want to reward any parties that enter them, they wish to deter unlawful behavior, and they simply recoil from using power to enforce
something impure.
2. Criminal Agreements
The purest form of a public policy defense case would be one
where a court refuses to enforce a contract because it promotes the
violation of a criminal statute. Pure versions of this phenomenon are
difficult to find for good reason. A “contract killer” would need to
muster a certain amount of nerve to collect an unpaid bill for a murder he successfully committed, using the public courts as the mechanism. I did identify several cases that did involve contracts that
brushed up against public interests expressed through criminal statutes. Though there is no significant difference between the outcome
of these cases and other cases within the agreements that “run contrary to statutes and regulations” category, they are prominent
enough to examine. Note that the term “illegal contract” is often used
broadly136—here, we are specifically focused on the use of the public
policy defense in the context of a criminal statute.
133. 975 A.2d 271.
134. Id. at 278 (quoting Thorpe v. Carte, 250 A.2d 618, 622 (Md. 1969)).
135. Id. (quoting Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 265 A.2d 759, 763 (Md. 1970)).
136. For example, the court in Lindmark v. Heuer, No. B205788, 2009 WL 3355098
(Cal. App. Ct. Nov. 3, 2009), used the term “illegal contract,” but the alleged “illegal” act
runs afoul of the California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, not a statute—or even
a criminal statute. Note that though the Restatement (First) of Contracts (see, e.g., §§ 580,
597, 598) uses illegality in its headers, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts do not. See PERILLO, supra note 4, § 22.1. The language often continues to slip between illegality and some form of violation of public policy. Calamari & Perillo use the title
“Illegal Bargains” but appear to use it synonymously with other commentators’ approach to
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Out of the forty-nine opinions involving contractual contravention
of a statute or regulation, seven could be deemed to involve criminal
statutes in some way, directly or indirectly.137 Within these seven
criminal contracts cases, four agreements were successfully attacked.
Though this presents a small sample, a description of a few of the
successful defenses sheds light on what happens in this zone.
(a) Kardoh v. United States
One of the oddest factual situations involving a criminal statute
was taken to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kardoh v. United
States.138 Syrian national Abdul Masih Kardoh found himself caught
in a federal sting operation. He paid $40,000 to an undercover agent
in exchange for alien registration cards for people who were not permitted to enter the United States.139 Kardoh was deported but never
prosecuted.140 Despite admitting to the undercover agent that he
knew what he was doing was illegal,141 Kardoh demanded his money
back from the government.142 The district court agreed with Kardoh
that he was entitled to the return of his property under F.R.C.P.
41(g).143 On appeal, the government successfully argued that the underlying contract was illegal and that Kardoh should not be able to
get his money back—in spite of the fact that he had not been convicted of any crime.144
The Ninth Circuit, drawing upon an in pari delicto rationale, determined that the government should keep the $40,000.145 Quoting
United States v. Farrell,146 the court noted:
It has long been the settled rule that property delivered under an illegal contract cannot be recovered back by any party in pari delicto. The general rule, in its full Latin glory, is
“in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis,” or “[i]n case

the public policy defense. Id. at § 22. The language tends to be slippery, but the intended
meaning with respect to the defense appears similar with either set of words.
137. Because of the overlapping nature of the issues in these cases (for example, insurance coverage relating to criminal acts), some of these “criminal” illegal contracts can also
be categorized elsewhere.
138. 572 F.3d 697 (2009).
139. Id. at 698.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 699.
142. Id. at 698.
143. Id. at 699-700. Rule 41(g) provides that “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return.” Id. at 699 n.1.
144. Id. at 700.
145. Id. at 698.
146. 606 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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of equal fault the condition of the party defending is the
better one.”147

In essence, the court held that in a case like this, the court was
not going to intervene to shift money or property around: “ ‘[I]t is contrary to public policy to permit the courts to be used by the wrongdoer [] to obtain the property he voluntarily surrendered as part of his
attempt to violate the law.’ ”148 One scholar described this as the
“pure fountain” justification for the public policy defense. 149 Put
simply, the court does not want to enforce sordid bargains, and this
notion seems to permeate all of these cases.
The Kardoh court noted that the in pari delicto approach was originally used to prevent funds used to bribe public officials to be returned to the briber,150 and was later applied to illegal transactions
like buys of controlled substances from undercover officers before
statutes existed to specifically provide for a forfeiture.151 I categorize
the Kardoh case as a criminal statutory case because, ultimately, the
public policy question focuses on preserving the interest that the
criminal statute was advancing. Even though there was an absence
of statutory law on the direct point of the forfeiture, the nature of the
transaction and its relationship to criminal illegality was the focus of
the court.
Of note here is that even in a seemingly simple case, courts look
closely to see where property should ultimately lie—and implicitly
consider whether a public court should be used as an instrument to
order the movement of property in these circumstances.152 Ultimately, defenses to contract often force courts to consider the wisdom
of using their public coercive power to move property around.
Where the subject matter is “illegal,” courts seem less inclined to sully their prestige.153

147. Kardoh, 572 F.3d at 700 (quoting id. at 1348 & n.21) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). One can see how this maxim also implicitly applied to the licensing cases.
148. Id. at 701 (quoting Farrell, 606 F.2d at 1350).
149. See Shand, supra note 3, at 148-57.
150. Kardoh, 572 F.3d at 700.
151. Id. at 701.
152. See, e.g., id. at 699-701. This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s
summary of these basic principles in Gibbs & Sterrett Mfg. Co. v. Brucker, 111 U.S. 597,
601 (1884) (“The ground upon which courts have refused to maintain actions on contracts
made in contravention of statutes for the observance of the Lord’s day is the elementary
principle that one who has himself participated in a violation of law cannot be permitted to
assert in a court of justice any right founded upon or growing out of the illegal transaction.”).
153. See A Law and Economics Look, supra note 18, at 1449 (“As Lord Chief Justice
Wilmot wrote in Collins v. Blantern, 95 Eng. Rep. 847, 852 (K.B.1767), ‘no polluted hand
shall touch the pure fountains of justice. Whoever is a party to an unlawful contract, if he
hath once paid the money stipulated to be paid in pursuance thereof, . . . you shall not have
a right of action when you come into a Court of Justice in this unclean manner to recover
it back.’ ”).
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(b) Lucky Jack’s Entertainment Center v. Jopat Building Corp.
Among true private parties (as opposed to contracts between undercover agents and their dupes), the underlying purpose of a contract might support an illegal activity, giving a court justification for
invalidation on public policy grounds.154 In Lucky Jack’s Entertainment Center v. Jopat Building Corp.,155 an Alabama Supreme Court
opinion, the contract involved a shopping center store lease. Lucky
Jack’s Entertainment Center agreed in the lease that “[t]he Premises
shall be used and occupied for the purpose of operating a video
sweepstakes center and for no other purpose without the prior written consent of Lessor.”156 While the lease agreement was negotiated,
the parties were aware that in other pending litigation in Alabama,
the legality of video-sweepstakes enterprises was being challenged.
The parties proceeded to execute the lease anyway, with the “hope”
that the operation of video sweepstakes centers would be found lawful.157 Several months into the lease, the Alabama Supreme Court
ruled that these operations were indeed unlawful, pursuant to a
statute already on the books.158 Almost immediately after this ruling,
Lucky Jack’s vacated the premises. At issue between the parties was
the enforceability of the early termination provision of the lease,
which, if enforceable, would have been extremely expensive for
Lucky Jack’s.159
The Lucky Jack’s court ultimately approached the problem in a
similar manner to that of the Kardoh court, applying in pari delicto
principles, though not expressly. Citing a similar case160 where operation of a lease would have “furthered an unlawful restraint of
trade,”161 the court emphasized that “it is a sound principle that when
premises are leased for the express purpose of enabling the lessee to
accomplish an unlawful purpose, the agreement is void and there can
be no recovery at the suit of either party against the other.”162
The lessee was not compelled to adhere to the termination clause
154. Under the law-and-economics taxonomy, this case might fit well into the bucket of
contracts to “commit legal acts that themselves facilitate acts against public policy.” Id. at
1449.
155. Lucky Jack’s Entm’t. Ctr. v. Jopat Bldg. Corp., 32 So. 3d 565 (Ala. 2009).
156. Id. at 566 (emphasis omitted).
157. Id. at 566-67.
158. Id. at 567. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-27 (1975); Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing
Ass’n, 960 So.2d 599 (Ala. 2006).
159. Lucky Jack’s Entm’t Ctr., 32 So. 3d at 567. Lucky Jack’s had only been operating
the business since September 2006 and the Alabama Supreme Court delivered its ruling on
December 1, 2006. The termination provision provided “ ‘Lessee may terminate the Lease
at any time after twelve (12) full months of paying rent, provided Lessee gives Lessor ninety (90) days advance written notice and paid a sum equal to four (4) months of the then
monthly rent with the termination notice.’ ” Id.
160. Id. at 569 (citing Ex parte Rice, 61 So.2d 7 (Ala. 1952)).
161. Id.
162. Id. (citing Rice, 61 So. 2d at 9).
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despite the fact that the purpose of the lease was legal at the time of
its formation.163
(c) Neve v. Davis
The South Dakota Supreme Court permitted a substantial forfeiture in Neve v. Davis.164 “Neve and Davis frequently gambled with
each other” at the Elks Club in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. From
Neve’s account, on one night in December 1992, Neve lost $1500 to
Davis and was unable to pay him.165 Neve had a litany of other financial
problems, including taxes overdue to the Internal Revenue Service.166
To help Neve meet all of his debts, Davis loaned him $2500 in
short order and the parties executed a promissory note for that
amount. Neve’s continued financial distress led Davis to refer Neve
to a bankruptcy attorney.167 After the attorney had reviewed Neve’s
finances, Davis loaned Neve an additional $30,000.168 Neve maintained that this $30,000 amount “included repayment of the $1,500
gambling debt.”169 Davis put the $30,000 in a trust account at the
bankruptcy attorney’s law firm and made arrangements for a
$33,000 promissory note to be executed.170 The amount reflected the
$30,000, “plus $3,000 representing a renewal of the $2,500 note from
December, 1992 and $500 in interest.”171 Neve later maintained at
trial that Davis cautioned him not to tell the attorney “that the proceeds of the note ‘were going to be used to pay off’ the gambling
debt.”172 The lawyer managed the disbursements of the proceeds of
the $30,000 in the trust account.173 Neve testified that $1500 from a
$4000 check from the account was applied to pay down “his gambling
debt to Davis.”174
Well over a decade later, Neve sought to have the promissory note
declared void, citing section 53-9-2 of South Dakota Codified Laws,
which provides that promissory notes given in consideration of gambling debts are void.175 The balance due on the note was significant.

163. Id. at 569-70; see Rice, 61 So. 2d at 8-9.
164. 775 N.W.2d 80 (S.D. 2009).
165. Id. at 81.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 81-82.
170. Id. at 82.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. Though a criminal statute is not being cited here, I note that this statute is
proximate to criminal statutes about illegal gambling. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-25-1
(1998) (“Any person who engages in gambling in any form with cards, dice, or other imple-
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Netting out payments made and including interest accrued, Davis
counterclaimed against Neve for over $80,000.176
The Court noted that for over a century, “the [South Dakota]
[l]egislature has provided that if any part of the consideration for a
note is for the repayment of money lost in gambling, the entire note
is absolutely void,”177 and proceeded to declare the entirety of the
$80,000 note void. As the statute dictates:
Any note, bond, or other contract made and entered into, where the
whole or any part of the consideration thereof shall be for money or
other valuable thing, won or lost, laid, staked, or betted at or upon
any game of any kind, under any name or by any means; or for the
repayment of money or other thing of value, lent or advanced, at
the time and for the purpose of any game, play, bet, or wager, or being
laid, staked, betted, or wagered thereon shall be absolutely void.178

Relying upon this statute, South Dakota courts have “consistently
voided such promissory notes.”179 The dissent maintained that the
connection between the gambling debt and the promissory note was
too “attenuated” and that “[i]t would be unfair and contrary to the
law to allow Neve to void his debt.”180 The majority, however, found
the statute to be on point and viewed the facts to support the
connection between the gambling debt and the note. The Court
recognized that this statute would yield “harsh results in cases where
only part of the consideration was for gambling, [and that] well
established law [did] not support the circuit court’s semantical distinction permitting parties to do indirectly what the Legislature has
expressly prohibited.”181
This language should ring familiar. Just as in the licensure cases,
where courts would tend not to permit unlicensed contractors to collect in quasi-contract when a contract was voided, in these criminalflavored cases, courts seek to avoid frustration of the purposes of the
underlying public policy. In Neve, as elsewhere, the court, upon finding that the contract (promissory note) ran afoul of statute and public
policy, refrained from enforcing the tainted agreement. The court will
not compel the debtor to honor the debt. Here, the lender lost recovery on a large promissory note because it was partially tainted with
an unlawful activity. The windfall accrues to the debtor, perhaps unjustly on an instant basis, but the ruling preserves the interests of
ments or devices of any kind wherein anything valuable is wagered upon the outcome . . . is
guilty of a . . . misdemeanor.”).
176. Neve, 775 N.W.2d at 82.
177. Id. at 83.
178. Id. at 83-84 (underlined emphasis added) (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-2
(1990) (emphasis added)).
179. Id. at 84.
180. Id. at 89 (Meierhenry, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 86 (majority opinion).
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the public, through deterrence of entry into unlawful bargains,182 for
example. One is again reminded that the courts’ rulings in these cases are not meant to reward parties like Neve. In the spirit of section
598 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts, comment a, these cases
are not about rewarding a given party—they are about declining to aid
any party through enforcement of an illegal bargain.
The common result running through these cases is that the courts
seem to leave the parties where they stood prior to the litigation.
3. Agreements That Limit or Shift Liability
The remaining largest segments of cases in the contravention of
statutes or regulations involve indemnification, exculpatory clauses,
and general agreements to shift or limit liability. The number of cases—they constitute about twenty-nine percent of all of the public policy cases in my sample—justifies a separate exploration of the content of the category. Though statistically the sample size is small, it
appears that the defense is twice as successful within the “direct contravention” category than it is in the “general public policy” category,
mirroring the larger sample. This category of cases has proven troublesome for some to analyze, but I offer a few illustrations here of
where the defense presents a statutory conflict. Where a statute
speaks, as demonstrated in the other cases, a court’s analytical task
becomes much less burdensome. Again, I describe the successful
instances of public policy defense because the judicial process is
more explicit.
(a) Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc.
In the Illinois appellate case, Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc.,183 the
public policy defense issue involved an exculpatory clause.184 The
plaintiff sought damages from a storage-unit rental company for loss
of her property.185 Dubey entered into a rental agreement with
Metropublic for a storage unit.186 The rental agreement contained
clauses187 that stated that Metropublic’s total liability for any loss of
Dubey’s property would be limited to $5000.188

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See generally Kostritsky, supra note 17.
Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
Id. at 274.
Id. at 271.
Id.
The clauses at issue stated:

3. USE OF PREMISES AND PROPERTY AND COMPLIANCE WITH LAW.
Occupant shall store only personal property that belongs to Occupant. Because
the value of the personal property may be difficult or impossible to ascertain,
Occupant agrees that under no circumstances will the aggregate value of all
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After a series of misunderstandings and blunders, the defendant
ultimately auctioned off Dubey’s property for $99,145 pursuant to
the defendant’s interpretation of other clauses in the lease and the
Illinois statutes.189
At trial, the jury found the defendant liable on a number of
counts, returning $5000 verdicts for both breach of contract and conversion, plus $745,000 in punitive damages for the conversion
count.190 From the bench, the trial court tried the count that alleged a
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, awarding $69,145 in
compensatory damages and $207,435 in punitive damages, in addition to $185,849 in costs and attorney fees.191
On appeal, Metropublic argued that in awarding damages in excess of $5000, the court improperly ignored the contract’s limitation
of liability clause. At trial, Dubey successfully contended that despite
the fact that the rental agreement was for a storage unit and not a
residential lease, the contract constituted a lease that was covered
under the Illinois Landlord and Tenant Act.192 This distinction mattered because the Landlord and Tenant Act looked disfavorably upon
liability-limitation clauses. The appellate court upheld the trial
court’s finding that the Landlord and Tenant Act invalidated the
$5000 damages limitation provision. When the parties entered into
a rental agreement, the Landlord and Tenant Act stated:
[E]very covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection
with . . . any lease of real property, exempting the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused by or
resulting from the negligence of the lessor, . . . in the operation or
maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against
public policy and wholly unenforceable.193

personal property stored in the Premises exceed, or be deemed to exceed,
$5,000 and may be worth substantially less than $5,000.
....
5. LIMITATION OF OWNER’S LIABILITY; INDEMNITY. Occupant shall
indemnify, defendant, and hold Owner and Owner’s Agents harmless from and
Loss incurred by Owner or Owner’s Agents in any way arising out of Occupant’s use of the Premises or the Property. Occupant agrees that Owner’s and
Owner’s Agents’ total responsibility for any Loss from any cause will not exceed
a total of $5,000.
Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 273. For an illustration of what this process probably looked like, see the
television series Storage Wars (A&E Television).
190. See Dubey, 918 N.E.2d at 273.
191. Id.
192. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/0.01 (West 1998); see Dubey, N.E.2d at 275.
193. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/0.01 (West 1998); see Dubey, N.E.2d at 275.
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The statute proved dispositive in determining that the exculpatory
clause would not be enforced on public policy grounds, because the
“legislative directive [was] to the contrary.”194 The statute helped the
plaintiff immensely because “[c]ontractual limitations are generally
held valid in Illinois, unless it would be against the settled public policy of the state to do so,”195 as it was there.
Interestingly, the case law did leave the door open for other public
policy challenges to the contractual limitations outside of settled policy, noting that such a clause could be voided if “there is something in
the social relationship between the parties militating against upholding the agreement.”196 In Part IV.B., I return to the damagelimitation cases to describe a few of the successful “broad appeals to
public policy.”
(b) Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center.
The next damage-limitation case involved an actual “unruly”
horse, one that injured the plaintiff. Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center197 addressed a familiar type of exculpatory clause, a
clause that shifts liability for personal injury related to use of a
product, service, or property onto a consumer. Hubner entered into
an agreement with Spring Valley Equestrian Center where the Center would provide horses for her to ride on Equestrian Center property under the guidance of an employee.198 Before she mounted a horse,
Hubner “signed a rental agreement and a release discharging Spring
Valley of its liability for any injury she might sustain due to the ordinary negligence of Spring Valley or its agents in relation to its ‘premises and operations.’ ”199
Through a grimly described series of events that may have been
the result of “Spring Valley’s negligence in equipping and using its
194. Dubey, 918 N.E.2d at 276.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Purolator Sec., Inc., 388 N.E.2d. 17, 20 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979)).
197. Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr., 975 A.2d 992 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009), rev’d, 203 N.J. 184 (2010). As established supra Part III, the analysis in this Article
has no stake in subsequent results, such as reversal. This analysis consistently focuses on
the run of decisions during this period in 2009. Therefore, the intermediate appellate
court’s reasoning remains relevant for my purposes.
198. Id. at 994.
199. Id. “The release agreement provided: ‘In consideration of THIS STABLE allowing
my participation in this activity, . . . I, the rider . . . do agree to hold harmless, release, and
discharge THIS STABLE, its owners, agents, employees . . . and others acting on its behalf . . . of and from all claims, demands, causes of action and legal liability . . . due to
THIS STABLE’S . . . ordinary negligence; and I do further agree that except in the event of
THIS STABLE’S gross negligence and willful and wanton misconduct, I shall not bring any
claims, demands, legal actions and causes of action, against THIS STABLE . . . for any
economic and non-economic losses due to bodily injury, death, property damage, sustained
by me . . . in relation to the premises and operations of THIS STABLE...’ ” Id. at 997-98.
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barn,”200 Hubner was thrown from her horse before even leaving the
stable. The horse fell on top of the plaintiff, rolling over her. Hubner
suffered fractures and other injuries.201
Spring Valley maintained that the exculpatory clause shielded it
from liability. Hubner argued that the clause was unenforceable on
public policy grounds. Just as in Dubey, the state legislature had
spoken to this specific problem directly, though not through a traditional statute per se. In New Jersey, the legislature had passed a
finding and declaration of the public policy of the state regarding
“equine animal activities” and risk allocation between operators like
Spring Valley and consumers like Hubner.202 The legislature also detailed some exceptions from this general declaration of public policy,
including exceptions to the “limitations on liability for operators.”203
The court, in considering the legislative stance, noted that the
“inherent risks” assumed by a participant “[did] not include every
danger on a training track or in a riding ring.”204 The court ultimately
focused on whether the exculpatory provision was unenforceable because the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by “Spring Valley’s use of
faulty equipment or its acts or omissions ‘constitut[ing] negligent disregard for [her] safety.’ ”205 The court viewed that the facts were sufficiently alleged to support a claim that Spring Valley knew that the
200. Id. at 995.
201. Id. at 994-95.
202. Id. at 994. This specific proclamation of public policy is worth examination:
The Legislature finds and declares that equine animal activities are practiced by a large number of citizens of this State; that equine animal activities
attract large numbers of nonresidents to the State; that those activities significantly contribute to the economy of this State; and that horse farms are a major
land use which preserves open space.
The Legislature further finds and declares that equine animal activities involve risks that are essentially impractical or impossible for the operator to
eliminate; and that those risks must be borne by those who engage in those activities.
The Legislature therefore determines that the allocation of the risks and
costs of equine animal activities is an important matter of public policy and it is
appropriate to state in law those risks that the participant voluntarily assumes
for which there can be no recovery. (emphasis added).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-1 (West 1998).
203. See Hubner, 975 A.2d at 995 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-9 (West
1998)). Among them:
(a) Knowingly providing equipment or tack that is faulty to the extent that it
causes or contributes to injury . . . . (d) An act or omission on the part of the operator that constitutes negligent disregard for the participant’s safety, which act
or omission causes the injury . . . . (emphasis added).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-9 (West 1998).
204. See Hubner, 975 A.2d at 996 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-3 (West 1998)).
205. Id. at 998 (first alteration in original).
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equipment it provided to Hubner was faulty and negligently placed in
an improper position.206 These factors, taken together, satisfied the legislature’s explicit exceptions to exculpatory clause enforceability.207
For these reasons and others, the court refused to affirm the trial
court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Spring Valley.208 The
general policy approach in New Jersey toward exculpatory agreements stands in contrast to that of Illinois’, as described in Dubey,
where “contractual limitations are generally held valid.”209 In New
Jersey, “[e]xculpatory agreements have long been disfavored in the
law because they encourage a lack of care. For that reason, courts
closely scrutinize liability releases and invalidate them if they violate public policy . . . .”210 In this instance, New Jersey went to some
pains to describe the exception to this rule (and the exceptions to
the exceptions) with respect to recreational activities.
These damage limitation cases strongly reflect the common law
approaches followed by the individual jurisdictions—and at the risk
of making an observation that may seem redundant, rely heavily on
the jurisdiction’s statutory regime. Though the presumptions about
exculpatory provisions can lean one way or the other, the justification
for escaping from the liability-shifting or limiting provision reflects
how the legislature addressed the specific subject matter relating to
the underlying activity.
4. Other Cases and Summary
The subject matter of the other public policy defense cases involving contravention of a statute and regulation span the gamut of
commercial and human relations. The eighteen cases excluded from
the categories of licensure, criminality, and limitation or shifting of
liability constitute thirty-seven percent of the remainder. The subject
matter of these cases broadly ranges from attorney ethics codes and
attorney fee agreements,211 to securities,212 family law,213 and assorted
insurance matters,214 among others.

206. Id. at 997.
207. Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-9(a) & (d) (West 1998).
208. See Hubner, 975 A.2d at 999.
209. Dubey v. Public Storage, 918 N.E.2d 265, 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
210. See Hubner, 975 A.2d at 998 (quoting Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d
381, 386 (N.J. 2006)).
211. See, e.g., Shafron & Kammer, LLP v. Krane & Smith, No. B200392, 2009 WL
2152902 (Cal. Ct. App. July 21, 2009); Sunglass Designs, Inc. v. Wild Style Sunglasses, No.
CV-08-1984-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2827953 (D. Ariz. Sept. 1, 2009).
212. See, e.g., Frishman v. Maginn, 912 N.E.2d 468 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009); see also
More Light Invs. v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., No. CV 08-0580-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL
2382997 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2009).
213. See, e.g., Chenault v. Banks, 296 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App. 2009).
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The public policy defense in these miscellaneous cases is successful fifty percent of the time, below that of the other categories within
the direct-contravention cases when combined (sixty-five percent),
but still substantially above that of the success rate of the defense in
general public policy cases (thirty-one percent).
Put in the broadest terms, the public policy defense is more often
successfully invoked and resolved in the most “ruly” manner when it
is closely linked to a statute or promulgated regulation than when it
is not. Occasionally, the public policy emerges directly from a statute,
as in many of the licensing cases—and sometimes state legislatures
expressly spell out public policy, as they did with respect to enforceability of exculpatory clauses.
As I move to explore the comparatively less successful public policy defense efforts that do not cite to a statute or regulation, but rather appeal more broadly, I do so with the hypothesis that this is
where the descendents of the “unruly horse” that Judge Burrough
described in 1821 now run wild.215
B. Content of General Public Policy Cases
The public policy defense “horse” starts to buck a bit more in the
set of cases that appeal more broadly toward a general violation of
public policy rather than a statutory one. As noted, the success rate
of the defense in this category appears to be half that experienced in
the statutory/regulatory category of cases. Fewer bright patterns
emerge in this category, as the cases tend not to cluster as tightly
around subject matter or other dimensions, with the exception of
agreements that limit or shift liability. No particular subsets of broader, nonstatutory public policy defense cases or subject matter seem to
reflect differing levels of success.
This makes description of these cases somewhat more challenging,
especially in light of the fact that sixty-nine percent of defenses
brought in this category fail. It is much easier to describe the reasons
and conditions for the defenses that succeed (the logic tends to be
more explicit) than it is for defenses that fail. Nonetheless, I attempt
to describe some distinct phenomena exhibited in both scenarios.
In examining the content of the broader public policy cases, I first
look at the cluster of cases that fall under agreements that limit or
shift liability, focusing on a few of the successful claims so that the
reasoning can be examined more closely. Then, I examine a few other
214. See, e.g., Abay v. DaimlerChrysler Ins. Co., No. 283624, 2009 WL 2477623 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2009); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garzone, Nos. 07-4767, 08-3895, 2009 WL
2996468 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2009).
215. Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing 229, 252 (Burrough
J.).
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successful claims in this “general public policy” category to see if a
pattern can be discerned. Finally, I select a handful of cases that are
difficult to aggregate within the “general public policy” defense category—the cases where the defense fails. A closer examination of the
failed defenses in the “other” category is required,216 even if firm conclusions cannot be drawn outside of the fact that the “other category”
might contain the parties who are pursuing defenses that would
prove highly unruly if accepted by courts.
In this category, one can hypothesize that if case law exists to
support the public policy claim, the defense is more likely to be successful. This is why I have labeled those types of cases “somewhat
ruly” and the remaining unsuccessful cases “unruly.
Table 4
Broad Defenses that Contravene Limit/Shift Liability
Versus Other
Contravention of
“Successful”
Total Cases
Success Rate
Broader Public
Cases
Policy
Agreements That
Limit or Shift
17
4
24%
Liability
Other

32

11

34%

Total

49

15

31%

1. Agreements that Limit or Shift Liability
As discussed in Part IV.A, exculpatory and indemnity clauses and
other contractual limitations of liability comprise a significant number of cases where the public policy defense is invoked. In the limitation/shifting of liability cases, the defense succeeds roughly half as
often in the “general category” as it does in the “contra statute/regulation” category. (This finding mirrors the overall set of cases.) Visiting the opinions that illustrate a successful public policy defense in the “general” category can inform an understanding of how
these courts make decisions in the absence of a statute—and can inform the question of how “unruly” they are.
216. Within the general public policy category, twenty-three cases where the public
policy defense failed fell into the “other” classification. This subset of cases constitutes just
over twenty percent of the entire sample.
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(a) Tatman v. Space Coast Kennel Club, Inc.
Tatman v. Space Coast Kennel Club, Inc., a Florida appellate case,
presents a classic example of a successful general public policy challenge to an exculpatory clause.217 The plaintiff, Tatman, entered her
dog into a dog show operated by the Kennel Cub and signed an entry
form that contained the following language:
I certify that I am the owner of this dog and furthermore, I(we)
certify and represent that the dog entered is not a hazard to
persons or other dogs. I agree to not hold [Space Coast Kennel
Club] or Brevard County Parks & Rec Dept. liable for any accident
or injury.218

On the day of the dog show, Tatman suffered injury when she was
bitten in the ankle by a “100-pound, non-neutered male Akita.”219
Though she had signed a form where she agreed to assume the risk
for accident and injury, the court refused to enforce the exculpatory
clause in favor of the Space Coast Kennel Club. Drawing upon Florida precedent, the court noted that “[t]hese clauses are by public policy disfavored in the law because they relieve one party of the obligation to use due care, [shifting] the risk of injury to the party who is
probably least equipped to take the necessary precautions to avoid
injury and bear the risk of loss.”220 Tatman marshaled the facts to
meet this judicially created standard, and she prevailed.221
Importantly, the court sourced public policy in this case from other
courts—essentially using previous opinions about public policy as legal precedent. No legislation or regulation was situated proximate to
the reasoning. In the next case, Vistein v. American Registry of Radiologic Technologists, this method of using precedent also appears.
After laying out the facts of Vistein, I highlight the problem that underlies this subcategory of “general” public policy cases.
(b) Vistein v. American Registry of Radiologic Technologists
In Vistein,222 a radiologic technologist challenged the validity of a
clause in a form contract indemnifying her profession’s private accrediting agency for any legal fees relating to her application or renewal of registration.223 After a dispute involving some alleged mis-

217. Tatman v. Space Coast Kennel Club, Inc., 27 So.3d 108 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
218. Id. at 109.
219. Id. at 110.
220. Id. (citing Loewe v. Seagate Homes, Inc., 987 So.2d 758, 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
and Cain v. Banka, 932 So.2d 575, 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)).
221. Id. at 111.
222. Vistein v. Am. Registry of Radiologic Technologists. 342 F. App’x 113 (6th Cir.
2009).
223. The clause in question:
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deeds on the part of Vistein with respect to her registration, the
accrediting agency attempted to collect $150,000 in costs and attorney fees pursuant to the clause. 224
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered Vistein’s claims that the
indemnity clause (which, in effect, is a clause intended by the accrediting agency to shift risk and liability related to litigation costs) was
unenforceable.225 Vistein also argued that the clause should be invalidated on grounds of unconscionability.226 She separately contended
that enforcement of such a clause would violate the public policy of the
state of Ohio.227
In this case, the court looked to Ohio case law precedents and
found that the clause, as applied to attorney fees, was enforceable.
According to the court:
In Scotts [], we . . . recognized the long-standing rule in Ohio that
“a stipulation by parties to a contract which permits attorney fees
to be awarded as costs of collection upon default is void and
against public policy,” while acknowledging that several Ohio
courts have carved out an exception where the parties have specifically negotiated the provision.228

In this instance, the attorney-fee component of the clause was not
specifically negotiated—it was part of a boilerplate adhesion contract.229 The Sixth Circuit barred the accrediting agency from enforcing that portion of the clause and receiving indemnity for the fees
because it would violate public policy to do so.230

I hereby waive and release, and shall indemnify and hold harmless, the [American Registry of Radiologic Technologists “ARRT”] . . . from, against, and with
respect to any and all claims, losses, costs, expenses, damages, and judgments
(including reasonable attorney’s fees) that arise or are alleged to have arisen,
from, out of, with respect to, or in connection with this application, . . . the failure of the ARRT to renew the registration of a certificate previously issued to
me, or the ARRT’s notification of legitimately interested persons of such actions
taken by the ARRT.
Id. at 119.
224. Id. at 118.
225. Id. at 118-28.
226. The court rejected the argument that the clause met the criteria for procedural or
substantive unconscionability and moved on to address the public policy question. Id. at
119-24. Unconscionability is a defense rooted in the transactional relationship and process
between the two parties, as opposed to any public interest. The public policy defense—in
contrast—seems to be more explicitly focused on the appropriateness of the use of a public
court as a mechanism for enforcing a private contract, as the criminal agreement cases
indicate, and on the impact on the public.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 124 (emphasis added) (citing Scotts Co. v. Cent. Garden & Pet Co., 403 F.3d
781, 791 (6th Cir. 2005)).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 124-25.

2012]

BRINGING ORDER TO CONTRACTS

605

Here, this general appeal to a public policy defense was presented
much like any garden-variety, common law decision. Because Ohio
law was developed in this area, the radiologic technologist had solid
ground to plead on. The appeal may have been broad, but it was an
appeal to established case law. Nonetheless, at its very root, the public
policy declared in this instance was developed by the courts—not by
the legislature.231
When the public policy defense is raised, if a statute or regulation
is not expressly involved, the source of the public policy could be anything. The approach to discerning public policy by a court could resemble a common law adjudicative approach, similar to the Vistein
opinion, but it can be broader. A comprehensive census of the sources
drawn upon for public policy could provide material for separate
study. But an open invitation for a court to discern public policy could
indeed become somewhat “unruly” if the sources are unconstrained.232
In this case, the public policy was manufactured in previous opinions
and then strengthened through further citation until the Vistein
court applied it.
In the context of tort law, noted scholar and judge, Hans Linde,
identified the trouble inherent in having judges apply public policy
without a legislative source:
The decisive difference . . . is that legislation is legitimately political and judging is not. Unless a court can attribute public policy to
a politically accountable source, it must resolve novel issues of liability within a matrix of statutes and tort principles without claiming public policy for its own decision. Only this preserves the distinction between the adjudicative and the legislative function.233

Linde’s legitimacy problem emerges within this subset of “general”
cases. The structural problem he identified almost certainly contributes to the “unruly horse” perception. Should the Ohio courts have
spoken on this attorney fees indemnity question in Vistein, or should
they have deferred to the legislature—or perhaps other rules regulating attorney fees? Similarly, should the Florida courts have spoken
about public policy at all in evaluating this tort exculpatory clause in
Tatman? A fundamental structural tension emerges between the
legislative role in creating public policy and its political nature
and the adjudicative role. In this context, I can only attempt briefly
231. Beginning, apparently, in this instance, with Colonel’s Inc. v. Cincinnati Milacron
Mktg., Nos. 96-1243, 96-1244, 1998 WL 321061 (6th Cir. June 1, 1998).
232. See McNeal, supra note 24, at 157-74 for a further complicating discussion of the
different areas in private law where public policy questions are injected into judicial decisionmaking.
233. Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: “Public Policy” Without Public Politics? 28 VAL.
U. L. REV. 821, 855 (1994). For a slightly more expansive view of the judicial role, see
Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 695.
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to describe this phenomenon, as it raises extremely complex
jurisprudential issues.
On closer inspection, these “successful cases” appear to be at an
intermediate level of ruliness (I call them “somewhat ruly”). The
judges in the cases use the term “public policy” when perhaps they
should be using the language of the common law. The words “public
policy” take on a different meaning than the common law—a politically-charged meaning, as Linde observed. Though the results in these two cases from the sample (and the next two successful cases I discuss in Subsection 2 of this Part) rely on a series of precedents—the
“public policy” language gives a misimpression that the courts
are making a political call, rather than discerning common law in a
traditional manner.
2. General/Broad Appeal Cases Where the Defense
was Successful
Outside of the exculpatory cases, nine other cases in the broader
sample of “general cases” exhibited a successful deployment of the
public policy defense. Below, I provide two examples.
(a) Chappell v. Butterfield-Odin School District No. 836
Chappell v. Butterfield-Odin School District No. 836 involved a
federal disability discrimination complaint brought by a school
teacher against a school district.234 The contract at issue was the release signed by the teacher upon her resignation.235 In exchange for a
brief extension of salary and benefits, the teacher agreed to end her
employment and release all claims against the district.236 In addition
to the salary and benefits, the district agreed to an additional commitment: “In return the district will not report you to the Board of
Teaching in the state of Minnesota regarding the revocation of your
teaching license.”237
Though the public policy defense was not dispositive in Chappell,238 the court rendered the release clause binding the school district from reporting a teacher to the Board of Teaching for misconduct unenforceable on public policy grounds.239 This finding—which
could almost be classified as dicta, given the severability of the

234. Chappell v. Butterfield-Oden Sch. Dist. No. 836, 673 F. Supp. 2d 818, 819 (D.
Minn. 2009).
235. Id. at 827.
236. Id. at 827-28.
237. Id.
238. In part, because even though the clause was unenforceable, the release contained
a severability clause. Id. at 831-32.
239. Id.
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clause—was made almost summarily.240 The court cited to a case for
the broad proposition that “[a] contract violating law or public policy
is void.”241 The Chappell court noted that even the school district did
not “seriously dispute” the public policy issue—that the school district
could not agree to surrender its duty to report information to the Board
of Teaching for the public good.242
Here, the analysis did not rely on a statute or a code. The logic of
Chappell seemed to be that it was just entirely obvious that enforcement of such an agreement would violate public policy and injure the
public good.243 Though this rationale may indeed appeal directly to
common sense, this declaration of public policy was accompanied by
little explanation.244 The Minnesota legislature or educational regulatory authorities could have fashioned an explicit and clear rule about
misconduct reporting, but they never did.
The question remains: Would it have been more appropriate and
orderly for a court facing this problem simply to point out that the
legislature and regulators had not spoken to this question, inviting
interested parties to change or create the law through the political
process? Would such an approach bring more order and certainty
and, if so, would it be worth sacrificing the judicial flexibility? Again,
these questions are easier to raise than answer. Nonetheless, though
this approach is not as ordered as one that relies on established politically created law, the use of precedent, even as attenuated as it was
in Chappell, lends some small degree of order and legitimacy.
(b) Cope v. Cope
The public policy defense surfaces frequently in family law,245 as
parties contract to rearrange financial commitments after a separation or divorce. Cope v. Cope,246 an Oklahoma appellate case, considered whether a parent’s agreement to waive child support is unenforceable on public policy grounds. In Cope, Mother had agreed to
waive child support in exchange for Father’s surrender of his visita-

240. Id.
241. Id. (citing Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd. v. Beens, 541 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995)). Ironically, the case the court cited to support this proposition would fall into
the category of a public policy defense involving violation of a code—not a general appeal to
public policy. See Barna, 541 N.W.2d at 356. The code at issue was Minn. R. Prof. Conduct
1.5.
242. Chappell, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
243. The plaintiff, who would have benefited from the protection of the clause, challenged it on its face to attempt to invalidate the entire release. This proved unsuccessful.
Id. at 831-33.
244. One also wonders why this court felt the need to make this declaration of public
policy when it was not required to do so to bring about a resolution of the broader issues.
245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 189-191 (1981).
246. 231 P.3d 737 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009).
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tion and contact rights.247 Several years passed, and Mother sought to
invalidate that bargain as unlawful and receive back child support.248
In this instance, once again, no formal legislation or rule was directly invoked in conjunction with the public policy defense.249 Noting
that “[t]he validity and legal effect of mutual agreements to waive
child support have been litigated for a substantial number of
years,”250 the court’s analysis focused on interpreting prior case law
as if it were common law, comparing and contrasting the facts of the
instant case to determine whether the agreement was enforceable.251
Having determined rather summarily that the agreement was unenforceable on public policy grounds, the court ruled that Father, in
theory, would be held responsible to pay child support in spite of his
agreement with Mother.252 In other words, the court discerned public
policy. In the end, however, the court did not need to do so since it
refused to find for Mother on grounds of equitable estoppel.253 Again,
as appears typical in cases where statutes or regulations fail to speak
directly to the public policy question in controversy, the court relied
on other judicial constructions to discern the policy itself.
Of note in Cope, one judge waxed about why the agreement between Mother and Father should have been enforceable in a special
concurrence. The concurrence is worth examining in more detail because the judge engages in policy advocacy, noting that nonenforcement would have the court actively promoting undesirable ends:
I . . . assert that the contract is enforceable. . . . Father did not pay
child support, but at a cost of the irrevocable loss of the joy and
love of his children in the bargain. Father can never recover these
fleeting childhood moments, nor can they be recreated. Mother received the entire benefit of her contract with Father. Now, she
wants that consideration which she relinquished, that is the unpaid child support for her children when they were minors, but
who are now adults . . . . I note that if this Court were to deny enforcement of this contract . . . such would be tantamount to condoning deceit and fraud . . . . A denial would also ignore the loss
Father has endured because he honored and performed the oral
contract to his detriment.254

247. Id. at 738.
248. Id. at 739.
249. Brief reference was made to an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision regarding support modification in the context of a related statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 112(A)(3) (West
2008). Id. at 740 (citing Hedges v. Hedges, 66 P.3d 364 (Okla. 2002)).
250. Id. at 739.
251. Id. at 739-40.
252. Id. at 740.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 741 (Rapp, J., specially concurring) (emphasis added).
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Could this concurrence have simply stated that the legislature has
passed statutes relating to child support—but none prohibiting this
type of bargain? Should the issues raised by the concurrence (and
conspicuously ignored in the majority opinion) have been debated in
a courtroom, or on the floor of a legislature? These questions surface
when the public policy defense is entertained in a general context,
outside of a statute or regulation.
Having now explored the way courts have addressed the successful broad appeals to public policy, I next explore the larger set of unsuccessful broad appeals to public policy as a defense to contract.
These cases prove much more difficult to characterize.
3. General Cases Where the Defense was Unsuccessful
Generalizing about the cases where the public policy defense was
pled or resolved broadly and unsuccessfully can prove challenging,
but a noteworthy portion of the opinions falls into this amorphous
category. These cases reflect situations where a party sought to invalidate an agreement and used this defense—potentially as a last resort. As Judge Burrough put it, perhaps with some overstatement, “It
is never argued at all but when other points fail.”255
Nonetheless, in each of these cases, the court addressed and resolved the defense, upholding the contract. Because these cases do
not give the defense a foothold, nor do they offer much logic for rejecting the defense, I label them “unruly.” Though it could be argued that
order exists when a court rejects the defense for lack of any support,
these cases seem to constitute one party pleading in the dark, looking
for any way out of the contract. Just the fact that the defense invites
these claims may contribute to the “unruly” reputation.
Given the variety in this group of cases, it might prove worthwhile
to describe several of them summarily. The first opinion, McDermott
v. Franklin, shows us a court that rejects the public policy defense
simply because it could not find statutory, case precedent, or any
hard authority to do so.256
(a) McDermott v. Franklin
In McDermott, a party wished to void certain obligations on the
basis that the underlying contract involved ownership of a professional corporation by nonprofessionals.257 The voiding party argued
that “the obligations in question were contrary to public policy as ex255. Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing 229, 252 (Burrough
J.).
256. McDermott v. Franklin, No. 2009-G-2903, 2009 WL 4894599 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
18, 2009).
257. Id. at *2.
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pressed by statute and therefore were invalid, unenforceable contracts.”258 The court held that the obligations were enforceable because there was no authority that indicated otherwise. The appellants cited to some state statutes that covered professional associations, but they were “inapposite to the instant situation.”259 I assume
that there must have been a lot of creative, unanchored bluster in the
lawyering because the court concluded: “While appellants go to great
lengths to make this [public policy] argument, they have failed to cite
to any case law to support this proposition.”260 This court seemed unwilling to buy any policy arguments that were not supported by statute or case law.261
(b) United States v. Korangy Radiology Association,
Korangy Radiology attempted to challenge the validity of a voluntary agreement it had entered with the Food and Drug Administration to settle a dispute over violation of the Mammography Quality
Standards Act (MQSA).262 Korangy Radiology had agreed to pay a
penalty, then defaulted on that payment and challenged the validity
of the agreement, raising eighteen affirmative defenses.263 Consistent
with Judge Burrough’s observation that the public policy defense can be
a last resort,264 the defense was raised here and quickly dispatched.265
The court did not address the merits of Korangy Radiology’s public
policy arguments. Instead, the court turned the argument around
and posited that public policy would support the enforcement of this
agreement—because the agreement held Korangy Radiology responsible for violating the MQSA, which is established public policy.266
This case may be another illustration that Judge Burrough’s
aforementioned “defense of last resort” observation held up well over
the past 200 years. This defense may indeed be the “Hail Mary pass”
of contractual defenses. But Korangy Radiology also raises intrigue
because the court provided an interesting quirk. The defense was devoid of support, but there was public policy supporting enforcement,
and it was in the interest of promoting a statute. When invited to go
258. Id.
259. Id. at *3. I decided to categorize this case as “general” and not statutory/regulatory or hybrid because the statutes that were unsuccessfully raised were attenuated from the problem.
260. Id. at *2.
261. Though, again, it might even be troublesome that the court left open the possibility that judicially-made “case law” could support a public policy finding.
262. United States v. Korangy Radiology Ass’n, No. RDB-09-cv-0623, 2009 WL
5108833, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 17, 2009).
263. Id. at *3.
264. See Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303, 2 Bing 229, 252 (Burrough J.).
265. Korangy Radiology Ass’n, 2009 WL 5108833, at *4.
266. Id.
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there, the court did not hesitate to take the opportunity to point out
that public policy ran the opposite way.
(c) Siuda v. Tobin
The procedural issue in Siuda v. Tobin focused on whether parties
could contract around statutes of limitation without violating public
policy—an issue that surfaced as the crux of other cases within the
general defense category.267 Siuda substantively dealt with a warranty issue with respect to the retail purchase of a modular home.268 The
Siudas, the purchasers, made several claims about defects and deficiencies in the construction process, filing a civil complaint several
years after the purchase. Tobin, the retailer, noted that the original
agreement stated that “[a]ny action brought by the Purchaser against
the Retailer of the home and any action brought by the Purchaser . . .
whether based in tort, [or] in contract . . . must be brought and filed
no later than one year from the date of the sale of the home.”269
The Siudas challenged this time-limitation clause, claiming that
the residual statute of limitations should apply. Among other defenses, the court addressed whether the clause was unconscionable. Importantly, however, the court first noted that “[t]he Siudas have not
shown a public policy clearly rooted in the law that prohibits this
type of limitation.”270
The Siuda court put the burden onto the Siudas and set a standard that required “clear roots” in the law to void this part of the contract. The court did not present any further analysis in the opinion or
address any specific deficiencies that the plaintiffs may or may not
have raised, aside from citing a case that supported the court’s opinion.271 Although a statute was at issue here, no general public policy
argument emerged to support the notion that these parties could not
be permitted to contract around the statute. This case is thus an excellent example of a court declining an open invitation to explore and
discuss public policy. Here, the court deferred heavily to whether the
law had spoken—and did not try to fill in the gaps.

267. Siuda v. Tobin, No. 285618, 2009 WL 3110817 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2009); see,
e.g., In re Dreier LLP, 421 B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); Ray v. FedEx Corp. Servs., 668
F. Supp. 2d 1063 (W.D. Tenn. 2009); Stecz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 159 Ohio Misc. 2d, 2009Ohio-7196, 934 N.E.2d 430.
268. Siuda, 2009 WL 3110817.
269. Id. at *1.
270. Id. at *2.
271. Id.
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4. Summary
I have reviewed cases in various different subsets of this general
category. Though summarization is difficult, one conclusion is that,
overall, the public policy defense appears to be substantially less successful when it is not closely linked to law created through the legislative or regulatory process. Occasionally, courts will discern or make
public policy through analysis that resembles a precedent-driven,
common law approach. More often, however, it appears that courts
are most willing to let a contract stand unless an express rule or
strongly established case law dictates otherwise.
This analysis still begs the question: How do we explain the cases—one-third of the public policy defense cases—that appeal to general public policy and fail? Perhaps these are the cases that have no
support—a defense that a party brings as a last resort.
This observation may bring some consolation in the form of
providing a bare modicum of order to the general category. Even if
these broad unsuccessful cases cannot be explained well or must be
described as unruly, nearly two-thirds of the cases can be ordered.
(a) “Hybrid” Cases
Occasionally, parties in these public policy defense cases seem to
appeal both to a statutory argument and general public policy argument, although not many cases seem to fall into this category.272
Even when this happens, the defense often leans heavily in one direction, which places it outside of the true hybrid category. Sometimes, a
party will argue down both channels in an effort to be thorough, but
courts appear to take the pleading in one direction or another. Although a brief mention of these “hybrid cases” completes the categorical puzzle, little emerges from these opinions to enhance our understanding of the defense.
(b) Testing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 178
Though the Restatement of Contracts in this area was presented
in Part II, it is worth briefly revisiting the purpose of the Restatement in order to test whether the purpose has been achieved in the
public policy defense arena. The American Law Institute declared that:
The object of the Institute in preparing the Restatement is to present an orderly statement of the general common law of the United
States . . . .
....

272. In this sample, only five did; drawing conclusions from a sample that small would
prove fruitless.
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The object of the Institute is accomplished in so far as the legal
profession accepts the restatement as prima facie a correct statement of the general law of the United States.273

The members of the American Law Institute who drafted the Restatement of Contracts originally aimed to summarize the common
law of contracts in treatise form. Eventually, especially in the course
of drafting the second Restatement, the mission evolved into a summary that also incorporated prescriptions for what contract law
should be. The reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, E.
Allan Farnsworth, wrote an article explaining (or confessing) that
sections 158 and 272 of the second Restatement were the result of
“[r]elying on the few cases that have fashioned more imaginative solutions [to govern] cases of mistake, impracticability, and frustration.”274 The drafters seized upon the cases that they wanted to serve
as leading cases.
The more obvious identified aim of the Restatement, besides
providing an accurate resource that “restated” the law, was to provide enough grounding to enable more precise “forecasting [of] the
outcome of future legal disputes.”275 Practitioners, judges, and the
legal academy indeed look to the Restatement for “clear-cut statements of rules.”276 However, the purpose of the Restatement of Contracts migrated over time from one of purely attempting to “restate
the law” (in the drafting of the first Restatement) to that of a hybrid
of literal “restatement” and aspirational architecture for innovations
that were developed by the drafters, predictability among the goals.277
The drafting of the original and second Restatements “provoked
an enormous body of legal scholarship, with the legal community debating the wisdom and effect of particular restatement rules.”278 In
fact, section 178 of the Restatement (Second) provides another opportunity to debate the Restatement’s wisdom. This section is sparsely
cited in the public policy opinions. Where the public policy defense is
involved, the “weighing” that section 178 proposes appears not to be
employed by courts. Balancing of interests in any form seems rarely
to happen in the determination of whether enforcement of the contract should be void on public policy grounds. The vitality of section
273. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS at
ix (1937).
274. W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposal
for its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 32 (1985) (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients
in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1981)).
275. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law as an Iterative Process: A Preliminary Inquiry, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 780 (2006).
276. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the
American Law Institute: The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995).
277. Keyes, supra note 274, at 54-55.
278. Abrahamson, supra note 276.
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178(1) only seems to emerge in practice when read in conjunction
with section 179(a) (where legislation is involved or invoked.) The
logic and spirit of Restatement section 181 (licensing) also surfaces in
action, if not citation, as described in Part IV.A.
Only one opinion279 out of 104 in the sample cited to Restatement
section 178.280 Only four out the 104 opinions in the sample appeared
to demonstrate any balancing or weighing in the analytical process.281
This speaks to the low impact of the Restatement on the public policy
defense. Why did the Restatement turn out to be so irrelevant? An
enlightened assessment of the utility (or lack thereof) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts should begin with the words of
Professor E. Allan Farnsworth upon the publication of the American
Law Institute’s work:
It is . . . of special interest to ask in what respects the Restatement
(Second) is innovative rather than traditional. To this question
there is no easy answer. Sometimes innovation does not take the
form of a new substantive rule but rather of a new perspective on
the problem, reflected in the substitution of a new terminology or
analysis for a traditional one. For example, the Restatement (Second) . . . speaks of promises and other terms that are “unenforceable on grounds of public policy” and not of “illegal bargains.” There
is no way to assess the extent to which such innovations in terminology and analysis portend innovations of substance.282

Professor Farnsworth’s candor, specifically with respect to the innovations relating to enforceability on grounds of public policy, invites an assessment of the Restatement. It appears that this particular innovation in the Restatement (Second) has proven fruitless in
the public policy area, both as an express source and as a basis for
innovation in the way the drafters might have envisioned. Put simply, the Restatement has not proven useful—and this Article empirically illustrates that conclusion.
With all of this examination of the literature, and the close study
of a tight sample of cases and the Restatement, a stronger basis exists for measuring up the “unruly horse” metaphor. Enough data is at
the fingertips now to make some tentative conclusions about the
279. See More Light Investments v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., No. CV 08-0580-PHXMHM, 2009 WL 2382997 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2009).
280. Though the 104 cases are the product of a filtering process for “pure” cases, this
one case was the citation of Restatement section 178 in the “all cases” database in Westlaw
during the period of study.
281. The only cases that appear to use this approach were U.S. ex. rel. Head v. Kane
Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D. D.C. 2009), Sanchez v. County of San Bernardino, 98
Cal.Rptr.3d 96 (2009), Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 983 A.2d
604 (N.J. Super. 2009), and Zakresky v. Grad. Sch. of Figurative Art of N.Y. Acad. of Arts,
899 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Table) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
282. E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1981) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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structure of the public policy defense—where it is “unruly” and where
it is less so.
V. HOW UNRULY IS THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE—AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT?
This analysis of a consistent set of public policy defense cases suggests that an alternative ordering scheme could be developed to enhance what was given to us by scholars, commentators, and the Restatement.283 My scheme points toward possible solutions for creating
more certainty and definition through a more robust description of
the defense. I recognize that a full prescription warrants separate,
serious treatment and analysis in the fashion that other scholars
have offered, notably, John Shand.284 I share a potential approach
here, rooted in some of the broader literature on judicial discretion.
A. Separating the Categories of Public Policy Cases
As I have detailed throughout this Article, the public policy defense tends to be twice as successful in cases brought with an argument that relates closely to a statute or regulation. Given that such
cases account for nearly half of the cases analyzed, this can lead to a
conclusion that approximately half of the cases are “ruly.” Regardless
of whether the court voids the agreement, if the defense involves a
statute or regulation, a clearer path toward a result has been blazed.
The court does not have to discern public policy or build on case law
precedent that might have unsound roots.
With respect to the other half of cases, a substantial portion of
them can also be deemed “somewhat ruly” in that they were, at the
very least, built on previous case law that declared or discerned public policy. Though this approach to the defense may constitute the
construction of a legitimate opinion on top of illegitimate roots, at
minimum, precedent provides some degree of order. Hans Linde may
find attaching any “ruly” label to this category problematic, but I assign this “somewhat ruly” label as a matter of degree.
The one-third of the cases where the defense appeals broadly to
public policy (and typically fails) appears to present the most disorder and “unruliness.” Most of these opinions present conclusions
about the defense without much express justification for the failure.
Perhaps this portion of the cases most closely fits with the “unruly
horse” metaphor.
283. Arguably, a more complete scheme could also address remedies related to the
defense. Some scholars have addressed this question, see, for example, Wade, supra note
18, but it would be a contribution to the literature to tether remedies to the scheme I provide here.
284. See generally Shand, supra note 3.
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B. Modest Prescriptions for Addressing These Categories
Prescriptions for reordering or simplifying the approach to the
public policy defense necessarily invoke some of the broader philosophical debate about judicial discretion and theories of adjudication.
Given this Article’s empirical findings, the logical next step for deeper exploration of this topic is some further philosophical development
of the public policy defense’s underpinnings. Accordingly, below I
briefly propose an approach toward the public policy defense that is
anchored in the literature on discretion and positivism. I will do this
with the caveat that the prescriptive angle of this topic invites an
analysis and discussion that I only begin to explore here.285
Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks define discretion as “the power to choose between two or more courses of action, each of which is
thought of as permissible.”286 Ronald Dworkin, in turn, offers an array of definitions of discretion that he aligns along a “weak” to
“strong” axis.287 Though Dworkin’s framework has been aggressively
challenged,288 it proves helpful in framing an understanding of
how one might begin to clarify our approach toward the public policy
defense problem.
Judges exercise the “weakest” discretion in cases that might be
defined as “ruly” or “easy”—where the rules and authorities clearly
point in one direction.289 The first category of public policy cases, those
that tether the public policy defense tightly to a statute or regulation,
should be placed, in Dworkin’s ordering, on the weakest side of the
discretion spectrum.
In the second, “somewhat ruly” category of cases, where judges
discern and declare public policy through the use of case precedent,
judges seem to be exercising a slightly “stronger” (but probably still
generally “weak”) discretion. In these cases, judges apply the interpretations of other judges; still basing decisions on an established
body of law, but leaving more room for discretion in the ultimate outcome. An extra degree of separation exists between law created
through the legislative/regulatory process and the instant case.
Granted, for exclusive positivists like Joseph Raz, who would argue
that only expressly enacted rules or standards are the only legitimate
285. I thank Norman I. Silber for encouraging me to develop further this part of the
Article. See generally, Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1299, 1300-04 (1997) (discussing and comparing the dominating definitions of discretion in the literature, particularly that of Henry Hart and Albert Sachs to Ronald
Dworkin).
286. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 144 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994). See also Rubin, supra note 285, at 1300-04.
287. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-39 (1977).
288. See Rubin, supra note 285, at n.18.
289. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985).
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sources of law, this exercise of greater discretion beyond the narrower source might prove comparatively more concerning than the previously discussed set of cases. 290 In this second category, positivists
would likely find cases based on well-settled uncontroversial precedent to be less troubling than those which rested more heavily on
“moral or extra-legal judgments.”291
In contrast, exclusive positivists would be most concerned about
scenarios where judges are exercising “strong discretion” in the total
absence of recognized legal sources, as in the third “unruly” category
of cases, the ones that appeal broadly to public policy without reference to statute, regulation, or even precedent.292 As Dworkin presents
it, in these zones of strong discretion, judges would not be bound by
standards or authority.293 Consistency and conformity of justice
would be at risk.
In this third category, judges simply are declining the invitation to
exercise discretion, where such discretion may be strongest because
no pre-ordained written rules of any sort appear to govern or compel
or even nudge toward a result,. Where there is no written authority
to support a public policy defense, empirically and anecdotally,
judges seem to back away from the temptation to attack or undo
the agreement at issue. They often reach this result without
offering explanation.
Judges tend to shy away from affirmatively invalidating contracts
where doing so would involve a purely moral imposition on parties
that freely consented to an otherwise enforceable agreement. The exclusive positivists should be comfortable with the process and outcome of the vast run of cases in this third category because judges are
reluctant to stray from preexisting sources of law. The Siuda v. Tobin case summarized above typifies the judicial approach in this
category—if the public policy defense lacks “clear roots” in the law,
judges will not recognize the defense.

290. Joseph Raz distinguished among precedent-based cases in his “sources thesis”:
“[T]he law on a question is settled when legally binding sources provide its solution. In such cases, judges are typically said to apply the law, and since it is
source-based, its application involves technical, legal skills in reasoning from
those sources and does not call for moral acumen. If a legal question is not answered by standards deriving from legal sources then it lacks a legal answer—
the law on the question is unsettled. In deciding such cases courts inevitably
break new (legal) ground and their decision develops the law (at least in precedent-based legal systems). Naturally, their decisions in such cases rely partly
on moral and other extra-legal considerations.”
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 49-50 (1979).
291. Id.
292. See id.
293. Dworkin, supra note 287, at 32.
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The question remains, however, about whether a hands-off, exclusive-positivist-themed rule should be the general approach in this
third category, or whether a more pragmatic approach toward preventing objectively harmful or extremely undesirable outcomes in
extreme cases could be accommodated. Perhaps the establishment of
a defined, pragmatic approach would satisfy inclusive positivists
like H.L.A. Hart, who wrote that “the rule of recognition may incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles
or substantive values.”294 Devising a substantive, values-driven rule
for handling these cases that broadly appeal to public policy might
lend more legitimacy to a rare exercise of discretion.
Using this theory about discretion, I contend that order can be
brought to the public policy defense. The first way order can be
brought would be simply to declare what is happening in the first two
categories of cases at issue, and formalize that approach in a way
that the Restatement has not. The second way order can be
brought is to set a blanket rule that the public policy defense
should generally fail in the third category. A “safety valve” can be
created, however, to ensure that in the third category, the court
can recognize this defense under dramatic circumstances.
Next, I conclude with a summary of how the public policy defense
can be reordered by providing a brief prescription for how courts can
handle public policy cases in each category.
1. Taming the “Ruly” Horse Where the Defense is Tethered to a
Statute or Regulation.
The first step in taming the horse should be to declare that if
there is no regulation or statute to invoke, the public policy defense is
completely unavailable. These are the so-called “easy cases” associated with weak discretion. This declaration would certainly satisfy the
concerns mentioned by Hans Linde about the judicial use of public
policy. It would definitely bring order.
If this approach was used by itself, it could lead to some socially
undesirable and harsh outcomes in instant cases. However, legislators and regulators could ultimately fix a serious glitch that emerged
from any such case. Legislators and regulators are expressly charged
with setting public policy and have a broader set of tools with which
to develop and craft it. This step alone would draw a brighter line and
bring order to the defense if courts adopted this approach consistently.295

294. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 250 (2d ed. 1994).
295. Although not much harsher than what some of the licensure and criminal case
plaintiffs experienced in the cases examined above.
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2. Taming the “Somewhat Ruly” Horse Where Case Precedent
is Available.
This second step in taming the horse should be adopted in conjunction with the first step. In sum, adopt a blanket rule that the defense
is unavailable unless a public policy interest has already been
identified in case precedent, or the legislature or regulators have
formally spoken through statutes or regulations. This statement,
which appears to encompass much of what courts appear to be doing,
would create a degree of order and make the unruly horse tamer.
The mere declaration of this broader “weak discretion” rule
would promote more certainty and order than the more complex, but
unused, Restatement.296
3. Taming the “Unruly” Horse Where There are no Rules.
The complexity of the public policy problem almost guarantees the
presence of a significant defect in any solution. One problem that always must be addressed is the remaining judicial temptation still to
take to the invitation of a broad public policy defense to prevent a
severe instant injustice. Dworkin would label this zone as one of
stronger discretion.
The routine yielding to such a temptation would ultimately yield
uncertainty.297 Perhaps the right approach should be to leave the
door open just a bit in narrow circumstances for creative acceptance
of the public policy defense, even if the courts should take a harder
line generally on accepting the defense. A new approach should preserve a public policy “safety valve,” where, in the absence of a statute
or regulation, the defense could be limited to scenarios where enforcement of a contract would lead to imminent social harm. Declaring the availability of the approach and making it explicit would provide order, even though it might invite more public policy challenges.
Take, for example, a situation where a court confronts a social
danger emerging from allowing a contract to be enforced. The danger
emerges not just from the contract in front of the court, but from the
queue of parties eager to engage in these bargains if the court renders the contract enforceable. The gestational surrogacy cases298 provide an illustration for that kind of a scenario. If a court deemed in
those cases that gestational surrogacy contracts presented a socially
harmful contractual innovation that the legislative and regulatory

296. This approach concededly leaves some disorder behind with respect to the use of
judicially-constructed public policy precedent.
297. For a rich discussion of the role of certainty and predictability in this context and
associated tradeoffs, see Shand, supra note 3, at 164-67.
298. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) and Calvert v. Johnson, 851 P.2d 776
(Cal. 1993).
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apparatus could not quickly address, a court could justify using a
public policy defense.
This narrow exception may prove important because one can
speculate that the pace of social and technological innovation may
present increasingly complex public policy questions. The interests of
the instant parties should still be of less concern than the stake of
the public in the interim period before the political system could act.
If this exception is kept as a true exception, order can still be preserved if courts are disciplined and selective about when to apply it.
Of course, one must accept once again the aphorism that Chief Justice Roberts recently repeated:
Extreme cases often test the bounds of established legal principles.
There is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the extreme case,
rather than adhering to the legal principle. That cost has been
demonstrated so often that it is captured in a legal aphorism:
"Hard cases make bad law."299

Implementing such an escape window must be done with an eye
toward the Chief Justice’s timeworn observation. Providing a tiny
window for stronger discretion may invite disorder, but if the rule
about discretion is formalized, the discretionary issue may be somewhat mitigated because courts would be afforded more legitimacy by
having this defined guidepost. A framework with a narrow exception
might also channel those pleading the defense to plead it in a more
orderly way—and enable courts to address the defense more consistently. These exceptional cases should not create public policy nor
should their content stand as public policy precedent per se. A balance must be struck. The exception can create order, but if the proverbial exception swallows the rule, the horse may prove more unruly
than when Judge Burrough first warned of it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Burrough’s declaration that public policy was “a very unruly horse” may have led to the repetition and perpetuation of that conception. I contend that the horse today is not “very unruly”—that discernable patterns emerge in looking at the common run of cases.
These patterns have not been studied in any previous academic work,
but they do present themselves after a careful look along certain dimensions. A systematic look at judicial opinions involving the public
policy defense, rather than a broader theoretical look at leading opinions, can shed different light on the public policy defense and narrow
the areas of unruliness.

299. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 899 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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If a simpler, workable approach is applied toward these cases,
based on a current reality about these cases that has not been cataloged, the perception of unruliness can diminish over time, and a
more elegant jurisprudential approach can emerge.
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